Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 019

Tuesday, October 21 2003

• RE: Rambam and creation
• RE: Rambam and creation
• RE: Rambam and creation
• Re: Newly Found Manuscripts
• Newly Found Manuscripts
• Re: new manuscripts
• Rabbi Yosef Bechhofer & Eruvin
• Re: R' Yosef Bechhofer and eruvin && early Purim?
• Re: R' Yosef Bechhofer and eruvin
• Re: Hashgocha Pratis
• Hashgocah Protis - Sifsei Chaim's view of Gra
• Re: new birth control?
• Re: new birth control?
• Re: new birth control?

Meir Shinnar wrote:
>1) What is the rambam's halachic position as
>formulated in the Mishne Torah about ikkarim?
>In the Mishne Torah, the rambam is very careful
>to use language consistent with eternity, even
>with an Aristotelian understanding of eternity.

In Hilchos Teshuvah 3:7 the Rambam defines as a min one who believes
"she-eino levado ha-rishon ve-tzur la-kol".  Hashem is the first and is
the "tzur" for everything. R' Yosef Qafah (ad loc. n. 35) argues that the
phrase "tzur la-kol" implies that Hashem created the universe out of
nothing. This is not language that is consistent with an Aristotelian
understanding of eternity. Yes, in Hilchos Yesodei Ha-Torah the Rambam
uses the phrase "mamtzi kol nimtza" but in Hilchos Teshuvah, when defining
a min, Rambam uses different terminology. This isn't my claim, it is Rav
Qafah's and he offers citations to the Moreh to buttress his definition of
"tzur la-kol".

>2) What is the rambam's true position?  Unclear.

I offered you a list of academics who believe that the Rambam's position
is clear and is exactly as he stated it.

>3) What is the rambam's formulation of the
>ikkarim in his perush hamishnayot, a more
>popular, exoteric work? The simple pshat
>of ikkar as formulated originally is
>consistent even with Aristotelian,
>although, as RGS notes, some suggest that
>implicitly, he is for creation ex nihilio.

The simple peshat is that the Rambam did not mention creation at all in
his ikkarim until he later revised them.  This is different from using
ambiguous language that is consistent with the Aristotelian position.

>WRT to the later addition, many view it as
>specifically repudiating Aristotelian kadmut,
>but not denying the platonic version

I don't have it in front of me and cannot quote it directly for you, but I
saw it last night and cannot imagine how anyone can interpret it as such.

>The origin of this was the claim, that
>in formulating the limits of acceptable
>belief, we start with common axioms, and
>one axiom that was suggested was that
>hashem was the boreh.

Even in the Moreh Nevuchim the Rambam writes that belief in an eternally
existing universe uproots the entire Torah.  The only issue is whether one
must believe that Hashem created the world from nothing or from
pre-existing matter but one must definitely believe that Hashem created
the universe.

Gil Student

> Meir Shinnar wrote:
> >1) What is the rambam's halachic position as
> >formulated in the Mishne Torah about ikkarim?
> >In the Mishne Torah, the rambam is very careful
> >to use language consistent with eternity, even
> >with an Aristotelian understanding of eternity.

> In Hilchos Teshuvah 3:7 the Rambam defines as a min one who believes
> "she-eino levado ha-rishon ve-tzur la-kol".  Hashem is the 
> first and is
> the "tzur" for everything. R' Yosef Qafah (ad loc. n. 35) 
> argues that the
> phrase "tzur la-kol" implies that Hashem created the universe out of
> nothing. This is not language that is consistent with an Aristotelian
> understanding of eternity. Yes, in Hilchos Yesodei Ha-Torah the Rambam
> uses the phrase "mamtzi kol nimtza" but in Hilchos Teshuvah, 
> when defining
> a min, Rambam uses different terminology. This isn't my 
> claim, it is Rav
> Qafah's and he offers citations to the Moreh to buttress his 
> definition of
> "tzur la-kol".

I don't have Rav Qafah in front of me.  HOwever, 
The word tzur in that halacha is  explained by the rambam in MN 1:16 - 
liyesod kol davar umotzao - and ...nikra hasehm yitaleh tzur ki hu hamotza
vehasibba haoseh lechol ma shezulato - again refering to hashem's role as
the First Cause.  I will look at Rav Qafah when I have the chance to see how
he deals with that.

> >2) What is the rambam's true position?  Unclear.

> I offered you a list of academics who believe that the 
> Rambam's position
> is clear and is exactly as he stated it.

And I offered others, including rishonim, who don't think it is clear.  One
can argue about what the rambam's position was (a different issue, and I am
not sure we disagree there that much), but the fact that there is a
discussion suggests that it isn't clear.  The problem is "exactly as he
stated it" is problematic - stated it where??? Given the rambam's clear
statement that he is concealing, one doesn't have to go the way of Leo
Strauss to realize that pshat isn't always simple...

BTW, one of the sources (Fox) is not so clear as you would like him to be
about rejecting platonic thought - which is part of the rambam's dialectic -
although he does reject aristotelian thought.  However, I don't think that
Fox would have argued that the rambam's position is "clear" or self evident.
(Kellner I don't have easy access to - it was out of print last time I
checked)

> >3) What is the rambam's formulation of the
> >ikkarim in his perush hamishnayot, a more
> >popular, exoteric work? The simple pshat
> >of ikkar as formulated originally is
> >consistent even with Aristotelian,
> >although, as RGS notes, some suggest that
> >implicitly, he is for creation ex nihilio.

> The simple peshat is that the Rambam did not mention creation 
> at all in
> his ikkarim until he later revised them.  This is different from using
> ambiguous language that is consistent with the Aristotelian position.

No, if creation is not part of his ikkarim, then the ikkarim are consistent
with the aristotelian position (as well, of course, as with the boreh
position)- by not mentioning the issue, he is saying that is not part of the
ikkarim - exactly my point.  (BTW, IIRC, the word kadmon is used in the
original ikkarim - and kadmon is an ambiguous word)

> >WRT to the later addition, many view it as
> >specifically repudiating Aristotelian kadmut,
> >but not denying the platonic version

> I don't have it in front of me and cannot quote it directly 
> for you, but I
> saw it last night and cannot imagine how anyone can interpret 
> it as such.
Perhaps that is the problem..

Given the rambam's specific endorsement of platonic eternity as within the
bounds of proper hashkafa, it would seem difficult to now exclude it.  The
pshat seems to be that as the rambam was deliberately ambiguous in the
mishne torah and the perush, and it was reconcilable with aristotelianism,
he wanted later on to make clear (at least in this forum) that he actually
rejected aristotelianism, because it was (and the essence of the concept and
much of the language is in the more nevuchim) incompatible with much of the
understanding of the mesora - and platonic thought wasn't.

RMS
> >The origin of this was the claim, that
> >in formulating the limits of acceptable
> >belief, we start with common axioms, and
> >one axiom that was suggested was that
> >hashem was the boreh.
RGS
> Even in the Moreh Nevuchim the Rambam writes that belief in 
> an eternally
> existing universe uproots the entire Torah.  The only issue 
> is whether one
> must believe that Hashem created the world from nothing or from
> pre-existing matter but one must definitely believe that 
> Hashem created the universe.

No, that hashem is the cause of the universe in more than just a logically
formal way - platonic theory is not creationism.  In the Moreh, the position
is ambiguous, as he starts out by saying that the problem with aristotle is
not that it is irreconcilable with the mesora - and then later says that it
is irreconcilable - and the debate is over which statement (both "exactly as
he stated it") he meant. 

Meir Shinnar 

Shinnar, Meir wrote:
> I don't have the perush hamishnayot in front of me now. The siddur
> version talks about bore, but need to look in the original (I
> suspect that there he talks more about mamtzi kol nimtza - which is
> not creation)

The Peirush haMishnayos, 1st ikkar, reads "Shehaborei yisbarakh shemo".

I'm not sure how much to make of it. The 2nd word of the chumash tells
you that Hashem is "Borei". An Aristotilian eternalist would have to
redefine the word, and therefore even in the PhM we wouldn't know what
was meant.

Beri'ah need not mean yeish mei'ayin. It could mean logical priority,
and given either an Aristotilian or a Platonic spin.

To summarize: The Rambam makes an ikkar out of believing in beri'ah. I
disagree with RMS's statement that it doesn't. "Beri'ah" is a loose
concept. It only rules out some forms of eternalism. But that doesn't
mean there is no requirement at all according to the Rambam.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org        for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org   the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905

From: David Shabtai <>
> I have always been interested in how the CI understood these matters.
> Could somebody please supply some sources from the CI's writings for us
> to look into. It would also be appreciated if the other sources could
> be cited as well - not as a challenge, just so those of us unfamiliar
> with the material can see it inside.

I saw this matter discussed in the sefer Butzineh Kadisha - a biography
of the SR zt'l written by Reb Sender Deutsch o''h.

He notes how the views of the SR and the CI on this were similar.
[Also re the 'kav hataarich' issue]

SBA

SBA writes "<<< IIRC the reason being that HKBH would not have allowed
Klall Yisroel to be nichshol all these years - and had it been relevant
or indeed the halocho so - it would have been in our hands centuries
ago.>>>>>

As I posted before, Halacha has always undergone change, and we therefore
cannot make any such assumptions. Before the SA was written, different
communities simply followed their Mara D'iasra. In the time of the Mishna,
Rabbi Eliezer's opinion was followed in his city, that the preparations
of Bris Mila override Shabbos, so that one was allowed to carry the
knife and even to manufacture the knife on Shabbos (See TB Shabbos
130.) The Zohar was first revealed in the 13'th century, yet the Bais
Yosef writes that the Minhag in Sefard was originally to wear Tefilin on
Chol Hamoed, but when the Zohar was published the custom was changed.(
Bais Yosef O.C. Siman 31) The MB does not seem to hold like the CI as
he often quotes Rabeinu Channanal or Ran or Or Zorua "that has recently
been published." He quotes Meiri in very many places. I'm not sure when
they were first published. (Any help on that would be appreciated.) When
the controversy developed about the sefer Bisomim Rosh, attributed to
the Rosh, did any Godol say that even if it's from the Rosh, we should
not take it into account for Psak Halacha?

Is it possible that the CI held that we are not sure of the authenticity
of the manuscripts and who are their authors? Or maybe that there are
many typo mistakes as RMF writes regarding the Meiri (O.C.vol.5,siman 20)
and regarding Radvaz's commentary on Rambam (Y.D. Vol. 2, Siman 7).The
first concern may be heightened due to a reaction to the known forgeries
in the past, such as Bisomim Rosh & the Yerushalmi on Kodshim which were
exposed after many Gedolim had believed they were authentic. Add to that
a desire not to make changes as a reaction to the R and C movements.

Kol Tuv,
Yaakov Goldstein

R Eli Turkel wrote:
> We know that many rishonim and acharonim worked hard to find the
> correct girsa in the gemara sometimes using nonstandard texts. I
> don't recall any of them saying that HaShem wanted that incorrect
> "standard" girsah. Yet somehow some people feel that way towards the
> printed "Vilna
> Shas". Same applied to Rambam and every sometimes to SA and Tur
> where recent research has discovered mistakes in the standard texts.
> Are we to assume that Hashem wanted these mistakes?

One more time: I think the point is that Hashem wanted us to evolve
halakhah in one valid way rather than the other. Not that the lost
book is or was in error, but that the Giver of History can use these
things to guide how we develop pesaq over time. Pisqei halakhah from
the sefer's interregnum therefore stand. But it is a procedural
statement, one about which shitah becomes law, not one of which is
true or correct.

As for the current lack of focus on girsa'os. First, there's the
phenomenon RJB raised WRT grammar: comparing girsa'os has become a
central part of non-frum study, so we shy away from it. Second, it's
simply not part of Brisker derekh's toolset, so as that derekh gained
ascendency, people stopped doing it.

I remember a few cases in shiur where RDLifshitz mapped a machlaqes
rishonim to a divergence in girsa'os. But, *IIRC* (!), with the
reverse causality; RDL assumed that Rashi advocated the girsa he did
of those he had access to because it fit what Rashi believed was
mistabeir. (NOT that the girsa drove the sevara.)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org        for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org   the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905

From: "Micha Berger" <micha@aishdas.org>
<<The idea that eiruvin are an appropriate forum for qulos in a way that
other dinim are not dates back to chazal.>>

If you are referring to the rule of halacha kedivrei hamekil be'eruv,
that does NOT include mechitzos, which is of course the nidon of all
the metropolitan "eruvin".

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

RGD wrote:
> I also look forward to the specific citation that eruvin are "described
> in the gemara explicitly as something we do in order to maximize women's
> enjoyment of Shabbos and participation in visiting, walking, and going
> to shul". I am not aware of this Gemara.

Amar Rav Ashi, mipnei mah tiqnu Rabanan 'eruvin? Kedei shetehei
ishah yotzah 'im 'ataratah veholekhet leveit haknesset, umareh
otah le'havrotehah, vekhulan 'onot a'harehah "haim ba'aleijh kanah
et 'ataratekh bemivtzah o lemitzvah?". Vekhein amar Ravina, kedei
shetehei ishah holoekhet leveit hakisei, kidedarshinan bidekhtiv matza
'hayim, matza tov... man amar zu ishah uman amar zu beit hakisei karov
leshul'hano. LeRav Assi, zu af zu darash. Mai vekhein? ki amar mar <<I'm
not sure how you conclude that cooking facilities and outhouses are for
the exclusive enjoyment of the men. Seems like those would have been the
ultimate points of equality of the sexes.>> ka mashma' lan kededarshinan
bemassekhet Brakhot. [Talmud Bavli, Mass. Eiruvin, 205a]

Arie Folger

On Tue, Oct 21, 2003 at 12:28:33AM -0400, Gershon Dubin wrote:
: If you are referring to the rule of halacha kedivrei hamekil be'eruv,
: that does NOT include mechitzos, which is of course the nidon of all
: the metropolitan "eruvin".

I don't know if that's true. In Flatbush, the issue was defining a reshus
harabim, not a mechitzah. I would think actually, questtions of rechov and
of population are overwhelmingly the more common problem than the actual tzuros hapesach.

At least, that was an assumption behind my earlier comment.

R Jonathan Baker wrote:
> Most of the major cities in Europe, and probably the smaller towns
> as well, had eruvs, since they were necessary for the *men* to enjoy
> shabbos, what with communal cooking facilities, outhouses, etc. that
> necessitated carrying outdoors. Now that we have modern indoor
> technology, the only rationale left is the feminist one, even if
> it's from Chazal, and contemporary poskim shrink from things that
> smack of feminism davka because feminism is associated with the
> liberal movements.

My initial reaction, as recorded on the side of my printout of v12n16
for later emailing, was simply "Feh". This read, at first, like Blu
Greenberg's "if there is a rabbinic will, there is a halachic way".

On further thought, though, there is an interesting aspect that makes
this case different than that. We know there is a halachic way. We're
discussing the acceptance of qulos. This isn't some C-like belief that
halakhah could be made to accomodate anything. We know the
accomodation exists, we ask whether we should be using it.

Also, Greenberg's assumption seems to be that the male rabbinic
hierarchy has no will to make the Jewish woman happy. Jon is
suggesting, IIUC, a very different motivation -- a general separation
from those issues that became causes celebre amongst the liberals, a
reaction to their action.  To put a halachic rather than sociological
spin, there is an imperative to separate from koferim, to make a
harchaqah from their their influence.

I think, though, that regardless of the gemara, few see eiruvin in a
gender-dynamic light. Yes, lema'aseh in today's world it's the eim
habanim who is most inconvenienced. But does encouraging and aiding
the "bas melekh penimah" (yes, I know I'm abusing the pasuq) have any
of the sociological feel of promoting a feminist or egalitarian ideal?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org        for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org   the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905

R Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
>>> "When a person does good he is dealt with hashgocha. However when
>>> he isn't good then if he was dealt with hashgocha then it would
>>> be impossible for him to obtain any goodness. Therefore G-d
>>> leaves him to nature where he can possibly obtain good in a
>>> natural way. In fact it is possible that providence for him is
>>> totally absent...."

>> Notice that RAK defines "providence" as goodness. I'm not sure if
>> he means the totality of HP (where the goodness is the deeper
>> "letav avad" that underlies even the ra), or only sechar.

> The above quote was from Rav Nachman not R' Aryeh Kaplan

We were discussing RAK's position, so I spoke using his choice of
source as indication of his shitah rather than speaking besheim R'
Nachman directly.

>> When one is writing a mussar text, one is looking at the question
>> prescriptively. Therefore, if there is no lema'aseh, why would the
>> author discuss it. However, when one is writing about machshavah,
>> the philosophical differences are of import.

> I am curious to know why you think that mussar doesn't require a
> clear understanding of theoretical positions....

Tenu'as haMussar, capital M, just like any derekh, requires
underpinning in machshavah. You need it for both intellectual and
emotional commitment.

However, mussar itself, as in advising people on how to improve, does
not include machshavah. It might include his'orerus to study
machshavah, belief in the centrality of self-improvement might shape
your machshavah, but receiving mussar is different than learning
machshavah.

To explain by example, Michtav mei'Eliyahu has letters which are
divrei mussar, and letters which are machshavah from a perspective of
Tenu'as haMussar. And mixtures of the two.

Emunah includes inyanei machshvah. Bitachon is the awakening of that
into the realm of mussar (again, lower case "m").

Whether HP affects every event the reader experiences will effect how
he views and responds to events in his life. It is therefore within
the scope of a mussar sefer. Whether it affects domeim, tzomei'ach and
chai is a machshavah issue. The first is therefore an issue of
bitachon, the 2nd of emunah. As I wrote, I thought there was a
consensus within Tenu'as haMussar on the latter subject -- but that
wouldn't make it mussar.

To continue this point by borrowing from another discusion, a post by
RML:
> To a Greek, faith is rational and dispassionate; in fact this cold
> way of looking at it is the malady of our world. To a Jew it is a
> process full of interaction and motion and passions. G-d is not at
> rest, Haya is also a verb of action, existence....

In Alei Shur, RSW denigrades "hashkafah" by giving it a definition
that is identical to the version of faith RML acribes to the west.

The acceptance of limudei machshavah, OTOH, is what we call emunah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org        for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org   the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905

> gil@aishdas.org wrote:
>>I refer back to my earlier post on the subject
>>(http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol12/v12n004.shtml#07) and the
>> citation from the Sifsei Chaim that the Gra held from what is being
>> called here the Besht's position. I do not believe that RD
>> Eidensohn refuted the Sifsei Chaim's peshat in the Gra's commentary
>> to the Zohar and the Gra certainly quoted the Yerushalmi that Rav
>> Schach allegedly rejected.

> Could you please explain why you don't except my statement that the
> Gra's position is dealing with the issue of knowledge not hashgocha
> protis....

R' Micha Berger wrote:
> I thought RGS did, quite succinctly. He believes the SC understood the
> Gra, and is relying on his authority rather than your citation. Not
> owning a SC, I must wonder if he was necessarily basing himself on the
> quote of the Gra that you give. (Then there's RYEibshits and the Radal,
> who the SC also attributes this position.)

-------------------------------------------------------
Here is my translation of the Sifsei Chaim page 87-88
------------------------------------------------------------

In summary: we learn from the words of the Rambam, Ramban, and Ramak
that only that which is solely concerned with animals -- without
any connection to man -- the hashgocha is general concerned with the
preservation of the species. There is not hashgocha protis to judge or
decree on a particular animal whether it will live or die. Whether it
will have a life of suffering or pleasure. Rather the individual animal
is governed by the laws of nature. In contrast concerning that which is
connected with the preservation of the species, G-d is concerned in a
particular manner to each element of the species...

In contrast if a particular animal is relevant to man or has a purpose
that is relevant to man it also receives hashgocha protis according to
the decree of the person.

 Chapter 4: HaGra: All that which was, is and will be in all parts of
creation, inanimate, plants, animals, man -- everything is included in
the Torah.

 On the other hand we find in the words of the Gra a different shitah.
It holds that even hashgocha clallis i.e., the natural processes --
is supervised in each particular for everything that happens. The Gra
writes the following in his commentary to Sifra D'Tzinusa chapter 5)
"The general principle is that all that was, is and will be until
eternity...is entirely included in the Torah from Bereishis until L'ainei
kohl Yisroel...not only the generalities...but ever the members of each
species and every person in particular and everything that will happen to
each person...from the day of his birth until his end and every gilgul
and every single detail...and also for all species of animals and every
grass, plant and inanimate object in every detail and all the members of
that species in full detail until eternity concerning what will happen
to them and their shoresh".

 It is thus openly stated in the Gra's words that all events that
happened and will happen in the future and every detail in the life of
every particular animal is written in the Torah. It seems then that if
everything is written in the Torah then it must be that there is personal
hashgocha on every single inanimate object, plant and animal.

 Similarly the Gra writes in his commentary to the Zohar "There are
natural processes but all is judged and supervised by G-d...because a
person will not bruise his finger unless it has been decreed above and
even birds are trapped according to Heavenly decree...but nature is the
shliach..." G-d's hashgocha and His decrees are actualized by means of
natural processes...so that all that happens naturally is under G-d's
supervision...

--------------------------------------------

The Sifsei Chaim is mixing knowledge of what will be with hashgocha which
is direct supervision. The Kuzari 5:20 already acknowledged that nature
is the messenger of G-d's decrees. The Gra is saying the same thing as
the Kuzari except he is adding that this knowledge is also contained
in the Torah. Everyone agrees that G-d knows the details of every bit
of matter. Rambam(Hilchos Teshuva 5:4) "Know that everything is done
according to His will..."

The Lubavitcher Rebbe states" Even according to the opinions which state
that Divine providence does not control inanimate objects, plants and
animals agree that G-d knows all the minute particulars concerning these
creations as Ikkarim(4:7) states: "We are forced to say that His knowledge
encompasses every entity found in the world and every event that takes
place. Nothing -- neither small nor great -- is beyond Him. Nevertheless,
He does not watch over (animals) to grant them reward and punishment
for their deeds. Instead, He watches over their particulars insomuch as
they are part of the general category, protecting the existence of the
species but nothing beyond that".[translation R' Eliyahu Touger].

The Chidush of the Besht is that there is hashgocha protis on everything
-- not just knowledge. He asserts -- according to Chabad -- that even
a leaf falling off a tree is from hashgocha protis.

                 Daniel Eidensohn

RAB wrote:
> The method being discussed
> (http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99994237) works by
> *suppressing* sperm production. Wouldn't this be different than
> *destroying* sperm? A healthy male is constantly producing new sperm. If
> that process is temporarily stopped, why would it have to be considered
> hashchasas zera - nothing is being destroyed, it's just being prevented
> from being produced?

It is not the method that is HZ, that is merely male birth control,
which is similar to the drinking of kos shel 'iqrin. HZ results from
unpermitted ejaculation. I suggested that the issue of HZ remains even
when no sperm is present in the semen. Thus, this new birth control
method raises two separate issues, and they are being discussed without
being explicitly disentangled.

[Email #2. -mi]

RMB wrote:
> 1- As I've posted here repeatedly, R' Dovid Lifshitz did make a general
> klal out of halachah ignoring the microscopic. (Could someone let R'
> Bleich know that someone else held of his chiddush?) As RDL is my rebbe,
> finding out he was mistaken would surprise me.

RDJDB's 'hidush is not to ignore the microscopic, but on the contrary, to 
consider it, where its presence is well known and is cause for concern (i.e. 
a foetus).

Arie Folger
-- 
If an important person, out of humility, does not want to rely on [the Law, as 
applicable to his case], let him behave as an ascetic. However, permission 
was not granted to record this in a book, to rule this way for the future 
generations, and to be stringent of one's own accord, unless he shall bring 
clear proofs from the Talmud [to support his argument].
	paraphrase of Rabbi Asher ben Ye'hiel, as quoted by Rabbi Yoel
	Sirkis, Ba'h, Yoreh De'ah 187:9, s.v. Umah shekatav.

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> I would be shocked for two reasons:

> 1- As I've posted here repeatedly, R' Dovid Lifshitz did make a general
> klal out of halachah ignoring the microscopic. 

But did he do so in instances where there is no other way of detecting
a definitive point of contention? IOW, would he say that semen equals
sperm? I would find THIS shocking. In no way can a liquid medium that has
no procreative ability be considered Zera. It is one thing to say that we
ignore the microscope when dealing with issues that have visuals to the
naked eye. Then I would agree that we ignore the microscope. But once we
realize that the real Zera is sperm then we have no choice but to accept
this reality. If we don't then we are perpetuating the falsehood of that
semen itself being procreative, irregardless of whether it has any sperm.

> 2- Hashchasas zera levatalah isn't defined only procreatively. Why do
> you assume that "zera" itself is? "Zera" is something that exists for
> purposes other than "planting".

> I think you're assuming too much based on the other meanings of the
> word. Semen could be called "zera" simply because it's supposed to contain
> sperm, rather than the word referring to sperm directly.

> The question,
> as you point out, is that the meaning bifurcated since chazal's usage,
> and now we need to know to which of the two halakhah refers.

Right, and I contend that new facts absolutely require refining our
definitions of Zera.

Zera is a concept not a percept. The concept's definition of Zera, or
seed, is that item which when implanted will produce offspring whether
animal or vegitable. In mankind the definition is further refined to that
item which can fertilize an Ovum and produce a human being. I can't see
any other explanation. To say that the combined entity of sperm and its
medium semen, equals Zera is inaccurate. That Chazal may have viewed it
that way is only because they had no microscopes to enable study of semen
and discover the existence within semen of something called sperm which is
the actual entity that fertilizes the ovum. Once mankind had determined
that fact scientifically the definitions of Zera change to accomodate
the newly learned information. Otherwise you reamin with an inaccuracy.

> On Mon, Oct 20, 2003 at 02:34:27PM -0700, Harry Maryles wrote:
>: You missed my point. I contend that in instances where there is
>: absolutely no zera present, for example in a totally sterile
>: individual, then any seminal emission would not constitute Haschasas
>: Zera. Of course there is Hashchasas Zera if a fertile man takes a
>: sperm killing contraceptive.

> It's not a spermicide, it prevents production to begin with.

> By your definition of zera, it's not hashchasah, it's prevention of anything
> lezeroa'

OK then it is not Hashchasas Zera. It is, however, making oneself a Krus
Shafcha. Does it really matter if [one is] castrated, or [has] a vasectomy,
or take a pill which sterilizes [him]? Aren't they all accomplishing the
same thing?

HM

On Tue, Oct 21, 2003 at 10:59:59AM -0700, Harry Maryles wrote:
:> 1- As I've posted here repeatedly, R' Dovid Lifshitz did make a general
:> klal out of halachah ignoring the microscopic. 

: But did he do so in instances where there is no other way of detecting
: a definitive point of contention? IOW, would he say that semen equals
: sperm? I would find THIS shocking. In no way can a liquid medium that has
: no procreative ability be considered Zera ...

You're still presupposing your own definition of "zera". By insisting on
a "zera" that is procreative you simply assert your position with little
basis. Words do drift quite a distance from their roots' prumary meanings.

:               If we don't then we are perpetuating the falsehood of that
: semen itself being procreative, irregardless of whether it has any sperm.

Only if procreativity was relevent.

Consider this alternative:

The issur of HZL is related to that of qedeishah, and has to do with using
one's sexuality for anything other than emotionally bonding as a couple.
The issur therefore has nothing to do with procreation, which explains
why it doesn't apply when one's wife isn't fertile.

This would make the issur applicable to a man who r"l doesn't produce
sperm.

It also preserves the trend of Hashem not giving a chalos to something
we can't see without instruments.

...
: Zera is a concept not a percept. The concept's definition of Zera, or
: seed, is that item which when implanted will produce offspring whether
: animal or vegitable...

This is the only real argument that doesn't assume your conclusion.

I agree that this makes the word dachuq, but no more so than "qedeishah"
which has little to do with sanctity, or the use of "dachuq" for
intangibles in this sentence, or the connection between an "iveir"
and skin, or....

In reality, zera (by any defintion) isn't a seed, the idiom would only
make sense if the woman's egg has no chalos. Again, it fits the "ignoring
the microscopic" idea.

Or, to put all this another way. Some plant seeds are damaged and
infertile, are they not "zera"? And if they can be "zera" why can't
damaged and infertile semen -- as well as the healthy sort? What is lefft
to say that it's only the procreative component of semen which qualifies.

Further, seeds are mostly food for the budding plant. Is "zera" only
that part of the seed that becomes the new plant? If not, why aren't
constituents of semen necessary for the success of the sperm (if all
were well) also within the word "zera"?

About the pill that started this discussion:
:> By your definition of zera, it's not hashchasah, it's prevention of anything
:> lezeroa'

: OK then it is not Hashchasas Zera. It is, however, making oneself a Krus
: Shafcha. Does it really matter if [one is] castrated, or [has] a vasectomy,
: or take a pill which sterilizes [him]? Aren't they all accomplishing the
: same thing?

Yes, it does make a difference. See Tur, EhE 5. Petzua' daka uqerus
shafcha have very specific defnitions, which are anatomical, not based
on functional effect.

See R' Shaul Weinbreb's article on tubal ligation, which measures the
limits of these issurim to see if there are gynecological parallels, at
<http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/english/journal/weinreb-1.htm>. Hopefully,
he'll take the time to comment, if his old email address still works and the
BCC didn't bounce..

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org        for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org   the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905      

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