Avodah Mailing List

Volume 09 : Number 045

Saturday, June 8 2002

• Re: Ikkarei Emunah on the Text of the Torah
• rock solid foundations (was--first principles)
• Re: Textual Variants in the Torah
• Donations
• Donations
• Re: Donations
• Re: Rosh meguleh and women
• Re: Donations
• Re: Donations
• Re: Donations
• Wishing Wells
• Re: Rosh meguleh and women
• Re: Derashah and sevarah
• Makor for Bris Sgula?
• Rosh Meguleh
• Re: rock solid foundations (was--first principles)
• Re: hasgachah
• Crime and Punishment (was Re: Hashgacha Protis)
• Re: Shabbos in Space
• Re: rock solid foundations (was--first principles)

On Fri, May 31, 2002 at 03:59:16PM -0400, David Glasner wrote:
: The method of k'lal u'prat u'klal is a mesorah, the specific application 
: for a specific derashah can be invented, just as moavi v'lo mo'aviah
: was invented.  (I know you will say that derashah was not invented,
: but I have never seen any non-dogmatic basis for saying that it 
: wasn't invented.)

Again, I mean they're discovered, not that they and their meanings are
all halachos leMosheh miSinai. A de'Oraisa is from G-d, whether spelled
out to Mosheh, or later deduced from what was spelled out. Isn't this
what Mosheh Rabbeinu himself learned in the 8th row of R' Aqiva's
shiur?

: Read the Rambam's introduction to Zeraim, where he flat out rejects the
: possibility that there could have been any conflict concerning a Sinaitic
: tradition....

Halachos leMosheh miSinai in particular. See
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol06/v06n093.shtml#20>, where I responded
to you on this issue before. (No, I do not remember what you replied. My
apologies.)

:> You've phrased this as though the interpretation is newer than the
:> text. What we have within Hil Mamrim is the permission to pick on
:> pre-existant interpretation over another. Which is why the mishnah in
:> Ediyos tells us the until-then rejected approach is recorded in the
:> mishnah. So that a later Sanhedrin can use it.

: Why reinvent the wheel? Again you are just asserting beliefs that
: you are free to espouse if you care to, but I hope that you are not
: suggesting that these beliefs are iqarei emunah...

As I pointed out in another post, I didn't intend to. I am using the
Divine nature of derashos as an argument in favor of including the
accuracy of the text in the 8th ikkar.

This too is addresses in our discussion of Mamrim pereq 2 in vol 6.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                        ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                           - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

>                           To me G-d's existence is a
> logical deduction. If one belives in material existence
> then there has to be a prime cause. Perhaps that is what is
> meant by, "one may not need a proof for the existence of 
> G-d because the existence of G-d is a "basic truth." 

> The problem lies in the various belief systems ABOUT G-d.
> In the case of Judaism, we are left mostly with either

Let me be sure I understand this. People like R. Soloveitchik and R. Kook
and many other gedolim, to say nothing of great non-Jewish thinkers and
myriads of simple Jews like me, all hold that everyday experience-prayer,
Torah study, moral reflection, thinking about history and so forth,
all testify to our personal experience of G-d. All of us are pretty much
failing to rely on reason.

If we were rational we could argue rationally for a (more limited)
idea of G-d as follows:
We would hold (1) that material bodies exist; (2) if material bodies
exist, there is a "primal cause." (3) There is a primal cause. Instead
of the flimsy intuitions of the Rav, R. Kook et al we have logical
conclusions based on rock solid foundations.

This deductive argument works very well if all three steps are valid. We
can all agree that (1) is true and that (3) indeed follows from the
conjunction of (1) and (2). But I see no reason to believe (2). [This
is independent of whether the world is temporally finite or infinite.]

I can see somebody beginning with a belief in G-d, who experiences G-d's
power manifested throughout the universe. Such a person may then exclaim
that material bodies cannot exist without a divine power sustaining
their existence. Asserting (2) may reflect that person's struggle to put
into his or her own words the experience of reciting the first Berakha
of kriat shma. But then it is the belief in G-d that is basic, and the
metaphysical proposition is a flimsy formulation of the G-d-experience.

I suspect that the Anthropic Principle does increase the probability
of divine creation. The best philosophers I've read are not sure how
much is really gained. (A non-Jewish colleague who is current on this
issue and with whom I discussed it, holds that most philosophers don't
know enough math to get to the bottom of it.) In any event, while my
willingness to rely on such arguments waxes and wanes with my reading
and thinking, my existential sense of purposefulness (which fuels my
intellectual curiosity) is much more stable.

On Thu, May 30, 2002 at 12:30:54PM -0400, Yzkd@aol.com wrote:
: For those interested in the L. Rebbe's response to textual variants in the 
: Torah please point your browser to: 
: http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/heichalMenachem.pdf

RMMS invokes "shamor vezachor bedibbur echad".

But what does he hold was actually written on the sefer place bein
habadim?

-mi

SBA wrote on Areivim:
> If yes, would it, however, be preferable to give the money to a
> struggling yeshiva, hachnosas kallah or a hungry family?

R Gil Student wrote:
> I'm not sure why giving money to any Yeshiva is tzedakah. Hachzakas
> haTorah, of course.

RCS wrote:
> I don't think that's correct. R. Blau in Tzedaka u'Mishpat (3:26)
> paskens that Hachzokas Talmud Torah comes before aniyim who are not
> your relatives, unless the aniyim are b'sakana and he does not seem to
> distinguish (based on a quick look and not limud b'iyun) between Talmud
> Torah for aniyim and for non-aniyim.

I'm wondering:
- When calculating precise maaser - should you take into account the %
that the meshulochim pocket?

- Does it make sense that a struggling Kollel of penniless Kollel-men
has precedence over an established mosad, and maybe even a night-kollel,
which is used to supplement income?

- Danny

From: "Carl and Adina Sherer" <sherer@actcom.co.il>
<<I don't think that's correct. R. Blau in Tzedaka u'Mishpat (3:26)
paskens that Hachzokas Talmud Torah comes before aniyim who are not your
relatives>>

I don't remember either the exact gradations or the source, but Rabbi
Y. Reisman came to the same conclusion in one of the Navi shiurim.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

On Thu, Jun 06, 2002 at 09:49:25AM +0300, Danny Schoemann wrote:
: I'm wondering:
: - When calculating precise maaser - should you take into account the %
: that the meshulochim pocket?

Back a step.... Why are we calculating precise ma'aser? As far as I can
tell, ma'aser kesafim is a 20th cent "minhag" that is newer than wearing
one's tzitzis out.

The only maqor I could find is that many autonomous qehillos used the
general concept of ma'aser to justify 10% taxation for their social
projects.

Remember the medrash about Yishma'el's "she'eilah" -- ma'aser of anything
but edible crops isn't din.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org            for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org       the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

From: kennethgmiller@juno.com
> My guess has always been that it is because of the historical development
> of two very different inyanim.
> .... At this point in history, if I understand correctly, no men had their
> heads covered except for kohanim during their avodah.
> ...my idea, which is that it took a few millenia for this minhag to
> trickle down to the point where it has become standard for
>ordinary balabatim to keep their heads covered at all times.

So what about the gemoro Shabbos 156b
 "Kaseh reshech ki heicheh deteheveh aloch eimoso diShmayo.."?

SBA

On 6 Jun 2002 at 14:28, Micha Berger wrote:

> Remember the medrash about Yishma'el's "she'eilah" -- ma'aser of anything
> but edible crops isn't din.

Yishmael's? Maybe you meant Eisav's question of ma'asering salt? 

-- Carl

On Thu, Jun 06, 2002 at 05:59:25PM +0300, Carl M. Sherer wrote:
:> Remember the medrash about Yishma'el's "she'eilah" -- ma'aser of anything
:> but edible crops isn't din.

: Yishmael's? Maybe you meant Eisav's question of ma'asering salt? 

Yes, I misspoke. Salt -- and pishtan.

Also, as I noted here way back when, Rome paid their soldiers in salt.
Which is why we have the English idiom "worth his salt". So, it could
well be that this medrash refers to ma'aser kesafim in general.

But even if not, if non-farmers had to pay 10% of their income, wouldn't
salt miners (and panners) and flax growers be included?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org            for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org       the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

In a message dated 6/6/02 10:36:39am EDT, gershon.dubin@juno.com writes:
>> I don't think that's correct. R. Blau in Tzedaka u'Mishpat (3:26)
>> paskens that Hachzokas Talmud Torah comes before aniyim who are not your
>> relatives
 
> I don't remember either the exact gradations or the source, but Rabbi
> Y. Reisman came to the same conclusion in one of the Navi shiurim.

What was the source or logic for this conclusion? Does it apply to anyone
who decides to learn and request support?

KT
Joel Rich

Anyone have any thoughts on whether it is mutar to throw a coin into a
wishing well? Forget about bal tashchis, is there a problem of avodah
zarah or darkei ha'emori if/since some people believe it helps?

Gil Student

R' Shlomo Abeles asked <<< So what about the gemoro Shabbos 156b "Kaseh
reshech ki heicheh deteheveh aloch eimoso diShmayo.."? >>>

Een hachi nami. But the married women were already covering their heads
for a thousand years before this, and in the mimetic society it didn't
trickle down to the single girls. (How would they have known of this
gemara anyway?)

Akiva Miller

Micha Berger wrote (9:44) 
> David Glasner wrote:
>: All I said was that GS and heqesh are based on word association, not the
>: application of some formal reasoning. I therefore think that it is easy
>: to distinguish between them and other hermeneutic rules...

> What about ribui umi'ut?

Those seem to me to be based on very obvious rules of inference and
interpreting texts. Lawyers use them all the time in interpreting
legal documents.

> Does "es" including one's older sibling in kibud av va'eim a formal
> reasoning step?  Or the derashah of "ach es Shabsosai tishmoru" to exclude
> piku'ach nefesh? 

Those seem to me to be clearly rabbinic derashot, that are close to being,
if not actually being, homiletic. 

> Or the repetition of "lo sevasheil gedi"? 

There are obviously derashot that Hazal relied on that aren't easily
pigenholed in the 13 of R. Yishmael. Just shows you that Hazal were
willing to go to great lengths in order to darshen p'suqim. Unless you
rely on the Rambam's criterion of the absence of mahloqet I don't see
how you can conclude that the threefold issur was transmitted at Sinai.
Not having studied the relevant Talmudic sources yet, I don't know the
extent to which those derashot are free from mahloqet.

> Klal uperat
> ukelal may include ke'ein haperat, but there is no formal system for
> defining the limits of that ke'ein.

The system is not completely determined, but it is obviously less
arbitrary than GS. By the way, there is a mahloqet concerning whether
we are marbeh k'ein ha-p'rat as R. Yishmael says or marbeh without
restriction as tanna d'vei Rav says. That seems to be a further
contradiction of the Rambam's position on the absence of mahloqet being
a criterion for a Sinaitic tradition. Similarly, there is disagreement
about which GS must be based on tradition. Some opinions hold that
only GS muphneh (or is it lo muphneh?, in other words GS based on
non-redundant words) may not be made up while GS based on redundant
words may be made up.

> There are only two derashos that could be applied by two communities that
> weren't in contact and produce the same results: qal vachomer, and ad
> sheyavo hakasuv hashelishi.

> In fact, for these two, the question is why they are midos of derashah,
> and not forms of sevarah.

So are you now conceding that new derashot are possible? There are
also disputes about the implementation of qal v'homer, i.e., does the
principle of dai lavo min ha-din li-hyot k'nidon apply in all cases or
only in cases in which it does not destroy the qal v'homer. All these
questions about the application of derashot indicate that Hazal were not
narrowly confined to a pre-selected set of derashot, but felt themselves
able to institute new derashot based on time and circumstance and their
creative capacity to extract latent meanings from the Scriptural text.

> As far as I can tell, it's because these are quantitative: which is
> more chamur, which has the preponderance of meqoros. Sevarah might only
> include qualitative logic reasoning.

Sorry, can't follow what you just wrote.

> But in any case, it's hard to see why RDG considers any of the other
> midos are less dependent on tradition or any more deterministic than GS
> and heqesh. Which would explain the machloqes (quoted in the haggadah)
> about the derashah of "kol yemei chayecha".

You make it sound as if I am out of the mainstream.  Look again.  You are.
Not that there is anything wrong (halilah) in being out of the mainstream.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

Chevra,

When our son Shlomo David was born, our son Baruch Yosef was just a few
months past treatment. At the time, we were told to place a water bottle
under the Kiseh shel Eliyahu. After the baby was picked up from the Kiseh,
Baruch Yosef sat in the chair for the duration of the bris. Immediately
after the bris was finished, he was supposed to finish drinking up all
the water before he could eat anything else at the seudah.

Someone else with a son in a similar situation R"L has asked us about
this minhag. We can't recall whom we got it from (and I don't remember
whether I mentioned it to the Chevra at the time - Av 5759 - but will
try bli neder to check on Sunday), and we certainly don't recall a
makor. Does anyone have one?

Thanks. 

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

SBA pointed out Shaabos 156b where R' Huna never walked 4 amot bareheaded

The headcovering for men issue has a number of sources in talmud and zohar
but their not all consistent-for anyone interested you could look at:

1.kiddushin 31a
2.shabbos 118b
3.kiddushin 29a
4.brachot21b
5.mesechet kala 1:16
6.mesechet sofrim 14:12
7.zohar-balak
8.zohar-pinchas

KT
Joel Rich

Before you read my reply I want to apologize for my ignorance of your
field. Philosophy has always fascinated me. I wish I had done more with
that interest.

Shalom Carmy <carmy@ymail.yu.edu> wrote:
>> not well enought defined. To me G-d's existence is a
>> logical deduction. If one belives in material existence
>> then there has to be a prime cause. Perhaps that is what is
>> meant by, "one may not need a proof for the existence of 
>> G-d because the existence of G-d is a "basic truth." 

>> The problem lies in the various belief systems ABOUT G-d.
>> In the case of Judaism, we are left mostly with either

> Let me be sure I understand this. People like R. Soloveitchik and R. Kook
> and many other gedolim, to say nothing of great non-Jewish thinkers and
> myriads of simple Jews like me, all hold that everyday experience-prayer,
> Torah study, moral reflection, thinking about history and so forth, all
> testify to our personal experience of G-d. All of us are pretty much
> failing to rely on reason.

That is correct.

I didn't say it wasn't valid however. Perhaps beleif can rely on intuition
which is derived experientially and emotionally. My understanding
of RYBS's Hashkafos are based on my reading of two of his monumental
works "Halakhik Man" and "Lonley Man of Faith". As my own feeble brain
understood them, both works began with the presumption of G-d's existence
and dealt primarily with Man's interface with G-d.

I certainly am not in the category of people like R. Soloveitchik
and R. Kook and many other gedolim whom you mention. I suspect that
these intellects are in the same category of brilliance as other great
intellects such as Stephan J. Gould, Albert Einstein, and Stephen Hawking
who have all come to different conclusions about G-d. This is because
all have relied NOT on reason but on subjective personal experience of
G-d or lack thereof. Experience of G-d is a very subjective thing and
subject to the not very reliable human trait of emotion. Never-the-less,
it can be and is a very powerful motivator that can drive beleif even
more than logic and reason. So beleif in Judaism and practice thereof
does not have rely on reason to survive. But, IMHO belief in the existence
of G-d is better served by the intellect and not emotion.

> If we were rational we could argue rationally for a (more limited) idea of
> G-d as follows:
> We would hold (1) that material bodies exist; (2) if material bodies
> exist, there is a "primal cause." (3) There is a primal cause. Instead of
> the flimsy intuitions of the Rav, R. Kook et al we have logical
> conclusions based on rock solid foundations.

I think you've put it very well.

> This deductive argument works very well if all three steps are valid. We
> can all agree that (1) is true and that (3) indeed follows from the
> conjunction of (1) and (2). But I see no reason to believe (2). 

You see no reason to beleive (2)? How then would you explain material
existence without a cause? Especially if you assert that:
> [This is
> independent of whether the world is temporally finite or infinite.]

> I can see somebody beginning with a belief in G-d, who experiences G-d's
> power manifested throughout the universe. Such a person may then exclaim
> that material bodies cannot exist without a divine power sustaining their
> existence. Asserting (2) may reflect that person's struggle to put into
> his or her own words the experience of reciting the first Berakha of kriat
> shma. But then it is the belief in G-d that is basic, and
> beginning with a belief in G-d, who experiences G-d's
> power manifested throughout the universe. The           
> metaphysical porposition is a flimsy formulation of the G-d-experience.

If you mean by "the metaphysical porposition", my proposition that reason
dictates that G-d's existence is a matter of logical deduction because
of the premise that there must be a "First Cause" it is not meant to be
a formulation of the G-d "experience". It is meant as an understanding
of G-d's EXISTENCE and that is all.

Anyone BEGINING with a belief in G-d, who experiences G-d's power
manifested throughout the universe is conceeding G-d'S existence
axiomatically without the benefit of logic and his premise is a "given"
to which he is not logically entitled. That an indivdual becomes a
believer, is an emotional response based on personal experience and his
conclusions based on his own inductive but inconclusive reasoning which
is nothing more than intuition. The metaphysical proposition that G-d
can be logically deduced as the Prime Cause is a default belief since
in a material universe everything must have a cause. I don't know why
you call it flimsy except to allow for an alternative existence that is
not material existence.

> I suspect that the Anthropic Principle does increase the probability of
> divine creation. The best philosophers I've read are not sure how much is
> really gained. (A non-Jewish colleague who is current on this issue and
> with whom I discussed it, holds that most philosophers don't know enough
> math to get to the bottom of it.) In any event, while my willingness to
> rely on such arguments waxes and wanes with my reading and thinking, my
> existential sense of purposefulness (which fuels my intellectual
> curiosity) is much more stable.

How did you derive your existential sense of puroposefulness? Was it
logically derived or is it some sort of amorphous intuitiveness based
on subjective experience?

HM

On Mon, Jun 03, 2002 at 02:39:10PM -0400, Feldman, Mark wrote:
: From: Eli Turkel [mailto:turkel@math.tau.ac.il]
:> I recently went to a shiur of R. Leff on hasgacha ...
:> His answer was that hasgacha pratit does not apply in a time of danger or
:> war. He did not specify but I got the feeling that he did not mean because
:> it was in Gush Katid. He meant that went a suicide bomber comes and kills
:> people sometimes one is killed or hurt because of the situation and not
:> because of his individual sins.

...
: thread, Reb Micha wrote <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol06/v06n142.shtml#10>.
...
: <<I get the idea that his model is similar to REEDs. I can't say I'm fully
: convinced without resolving that "mikreh" issue. But it seems like the
: Rihal holds that even though mikreh and bechirah are possibilities,
: HKBH controls which choices someone faces, and which further evolve to
: impact you. Therefore everything you recieve is fully from HKBH. >>

: Am I right in assuming that R Leff disagrees with R Micha (not that R
: Leff is specifically interpreting the Kuzari)?

Well, if we're talking about one's bechirah being a factor other than HP
in another's life, there's the famous (to Avodah old-timers, certainly)
Ohr haChaim on Bereishis. The brothers choose to throw Yosef in a pit
because that puts his survival in Hashem's hands, rather than kill him
themselves. The OH says it's because they were afraid that if they kill
him directly it will be their bechirah that caused his death even if HP
would have dictated that he didn't deserve it.

"Nipelah na beYad Hashem ..., ubeyad adam al epolah."

But R' Leff, as reported, spoke more of the situation than the people
who set it up. Perhaps he's saying that in the bitachon-hishtadlus mix,
a situation of saqanah requires alot more bitachon, because the teva side
is so negative. Or (if this actually is a different idea) the gemara's
statement that when one awakens midas hadin when in a maqom saqanah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905             - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

On Tue, Jun 04, 2002 at 10:13:02PM +0200, R'it RF wrote:
:> Does hashem actually given petchelach? I was under the impression that
:> onesh is a consequence of cheit...

: I don't see the contradiction. The potch was a consequence of the child
: trying to put his hand in the fire....

: The difference between the two is that one is a direct intervention
: meant to teach [the potch] and one is just what we could call hester
: panim of a sort, allowing the consequences to impose themselves by
: natural consequences [the burn].

My question was based on the idea that the intervention in order teach
is the consequence of the act. This was the conclusion I reached from
the sources RGS and I cited.

My philosophical objection to your split is that it separates the stove,
the concept of fire, the idea that fire causes pain, etc... from the
parent. In our case, He Who set up the system by which the child gets
burnt is He Who punishes. So how are the nimshallim for the two different?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905             - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

[My apologies to R' Chaim Markowitz, but while holding on to his email
to decide if it was close enough to the Areivim conversation to go there,
I lost it. RGS quotes the body of his email in the entirety, AFAIR. -mi]

>This caught my eye and I wonder if anyone has actual sources for this psak.

>  ISRAELI ASTRONAUT PLANS FOR SHABBAT IN SPACE
>Col. Ilan Ramon, the first Israeli astronaut, will be taking off as part of 
>the crew of NASA's space shuttle Columbia in July.

>One of the Torah scholars consulted on the issue, Rabbi Levy Yitzchak
>Halperin, has ruled that Ramon is exempt from the Sabbath prohibitions, as 
>he will not be experiencing Earth time.

I think Rav Goren suggested that pesak. Rav Kasher discusses
it in chapter 5 of his HaAdam Al HaYareach which is online at
http://www.hebrewbooks.org

Gil

On Wed, Jun 05, 2002 at 11:15:43PM -0400, Shalom Carmy wrote:
: I suspect that the Anthropic Principle does increase the probability
: of divine creation...

As I wrote, I know of two very different versions of the anthropic
principle. See <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol09/v09n043.shtml#16>.
Neither really explain the odds.

(The weak anthropic principle simply says that the odds of it being 10
heads given that we find 10 heads is 100%. The odds that things turn
out a way that supports the existance of people given the exitance of
people to ask the question is 100%. Regardless of the odds without
that given.)

The question is whether the improbable occuring increases the odds that
the process isn't as random as assumed. It certainly increases those
odds compared to those if we don't know yet that the law of large numbers
was obeyed. But how much do the odds change?

Lemashal: If a coin falls 10 times, and you don't know how it landed,
there is some chance a person intentionally put it down on one side or
another intentionally. If you look, and find that 6 of them are heads
in no particular order, there is a different chance they were placed.
If you look, and find all 10 are heds, there is yet a third chance. This
lattermost situation has the highest odds of intentional placement.

We can't really discuss what the odds are, though. Because you can't
compute the odds that a person would want them all to be heads to
compare it to the 1/1024 of it being random.

On Fri, Jun 07, 2002 at 09:41:06AM -0700, Harry Maryles wrote:
: I didn't say it wasn't valid however. Perhaps beleif can rely on intuition
: which is derived experientially and emotionally...

Reason can only explain ideas based on logically prior ideas. At some
point, we have to rely on first principles. Where are we to turn other
than our senses and experience?

I'm not sure about "emotionally", though. Instead, I would define the
feeling of deveiqus that a correctly said Shemoneh Esrei can bring
into two parts: the emotion, and the experience itself that caused the
emotion. Just because the experience is entirely within the individual's
mind doesn't mean it's necessarily subjective.

Many people don't like brussels sprouts. Again, there are two issues:
the shared dislike, and those features of the taste that various people
don't like.

When we find some sevrah (or math proof or scientific theory) to be
beautiful there are also two parts: the aethetic judgement, and the
intellectual features of the sevarah that we are judging.

:> We would hold (1) that material bodies exist; (2) if material bodies
:> exist, there is a "primal cause." (3) There is a primal cause...

:> This deductive argument works very well if all three steps are valid. We
:> can all agree that (1) is true and that (3) indeed follows from the
:> conjunction of (1) and (2). But I see no reason to believe (2). 
: 
: You see no reason to beleive (2)? How then would you explain material
: existence without a cause? Especially if you assert that:
:> [This is
:> independent of whether the world is temporally finite or infinite.]

Well, the alternative is that it is simply a random event. The event
marks a start, but is causeless.

In any case, the original argument presumes causality, which would
either have to be proven or accepted as a first principle with all
the issues I've been raising about those.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                        ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                           - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

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