Avodah Mailing List

Volume 07 : Number 055

Tuesday, June 5 2001

• RE: suffering and repentance
• Re: Halicha B'Keri
• RE: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• Re: Halicha B'Keri
• Re: CI
• RE: Forbidding the Permitted and Permitting the Forbidden.
• Re: Forbidding the Permitted and Permitting the Forbidden.
• Re: Forbidding the Permitted and Permitting the Forbidden.
• Re: Forbidding the Permitted and Permitting the Forbidden.
• Re: Forbidding the Permitted and Permitting the Forbidden.
• Re: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• RE: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• RE: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• Halicha B'Keri
• Re: Yiud
• RE: mixed dancing (reward and punishment)
• RE: mixed dancing
• Re: Dor Revi'i on b'ha'alotkha et ha-neirot
• Re: Dor Revi'i on Pesah Sheini
• Re: Dor Revi'i on v'ha-ish moshe anav mi-kol ha-adam

From: Shalom Carmy [mailto:carmy@ymail.yu.edu]
> According to the Halakha the message is always there. But it isn't always
> attended to. The interpretation of my book is correct. I would add that
> Hazal's dictum that "today" there is nobody capable of giving tokhaha. I
> believe (though I'm not sure that I can prove this as pshat) that one
> reason we cannot give tokhaha is that potential reprovers are unable to
> identify sufficiently with others to get them to take the message personally.

Am I right in saying that what you mean by "the message is always there" in
the case of suffering which is part of hashgacha klalis is that the sufferer
is receiving the message that he (like most people) does not merit hashgacha
pratis.  However, the form of the suffering is not a message--the suffering
resulted from olam k'minhago noheg.  Consequently, *if* a dance floor
buckles as a result of hashgacha klalis, there can be no anti-mixed dancing
message embedded in the event.

From: "Carl and Adina Sherer" <sherer@actcom.co.il>
>> FWIW, we have been threatened with the exact opposite, which implies that we
>> should be able to figure out the connection in many instances. Where the
>> Posuk says: "... VaHaLachtem Imi B'Keri. V'Halachti Imachem B'Chamat Keri
>> .."  (B'CHukotai 26:27) the meaning I have always heard is that when we are
>> extremely bad, Hashem's punishments will be so unrelated to our Aveiros that
>> we won't see the connection, depriving us of the opportunity to learn and
>> better ourselves. Does this not mean that when our behavior does not quite
>> reach such an egregious state, the punishments will relate to our aveiros,
>> enabling us to correct it ?

> Interesting. I understood "keri" there as coming from the "mikri" or
> "mikreh," meaning that Hashem's hashgacha will abandon us R"L
> and whatever happens, happens. The way you are understanding it,
> Hashem DAVKA will give us punishments R"L that are unrelated.
> But how are you interpreting the word "keri" if the punishments are
> planned and don't "just happen?" That they appear to just happen?

Yes. Eilu V'Eilu. I don't remember where I heard this Pshat but it seemed to 
make sense at the time. My feeling was/is that the Onesh will so "appear" to 
be by happenstance - that people will not see the connection. This is 
consistent with the concept that the "Keri" itself is also an Onesh.

Stuart

Moshe Feldman wrote:
> Question: which *Rishonim* clearly disagree with Ramban/Rambam?
     
I wrote:
> R. Saadia Gaon, for one. I believe that R. Chasdai Crescas and R. Yosef Albo 
> do, as well (I count them both as Rishonim). The Kuzari might (see the 
> discussion in Avodah in the thread titled Kuzari and Hashgachah). I don't
> recall seeing the concept of mikreh in the Derashos HaRan either but I could
> be mistaken.
     
I might have to revise what I wrote above.

In his Or Hashem (2:2:1-2, Fischer ed. pp. 151-162), R. Chasdai Crescas quotes 
the Ralbag's view of hashgachah which includes the idea that people receive 
providence according to their madregah.  He then spends the next chapter (2:2:3,
pp. 162-166) refuting this view, without mentioning the idea that different 
people have different levels of hashgachah.  In his own formulation of 
hashgachah, he does not mention this idea.  Presumably, he disagrees with it, 
particularly since he disagrees with the entire Aristotelian framework upon 
which it is based.

However, in 3:1:3:3 (p. 333), while discussing mazal, he might be implying that 
different people have different levels of hashgachah.  I think there is another 
way to read this passage (cf. Sefer HaIkkarim 4:13 , Horev ed. p. 489) but that 
may be my forcing an unintended message into his words.

R. Yosef Albo, in his Sefer HaIkkarim (4:10, p. 476) quotes the Rambam (Moreh 
Nevuchim 3:18) about different people receiving different levels of hasgachah.  
In the next chapter (4:11, pp. 481-484), R. Albo quotes the view of Ralbag on 
hashgachah, the very view that R. Chasdai Crescas attempted to refute.  It seems
pretty clear in his presentation that he holds of these views.  Yet, in his 
subsequent discussion of sechar ve'onesh (4:12ff) he certainly contradicts the 
Ralbag's view and never cites the Rambam's view to explain tzaddik vera lo or 
rasha vetov lo.  What is going on?

Any thought?

Gil Student

Sun, 3 Jun 2001 03:58:34 +0400 "Carl and Adina Sherer" <sherer@actcom.co.il>
> And if R"L MY child is sick, how is that a punishment to the Klal?

It IS a punishment for the klal, R"L we are unable to feel it because we
are not 'in tune' to all being part of 'klal yisroel'. Were we all to feel
the pain of every sick child because he is OUR child, massive tragedies
would not be needed. Klal yisroel would repent when any one child was hurt
or sick, R"L. We would all see any sick child as our fault and repent.

On Tue, Jun 05, 2001 at 10:21:29AM -0400, Stein, Aryeh E. wrote [to Areivim]:
: Of course we have to take it to heart, and onesh is not divine vengence but
: punishment and a call to do teshuva.  However, we don't have neviim to "tell
: us *exactly* what we need to be mesaken."  We can guess, and with the advice
: of gedolim, we can hopefully guess correctly, but we will never know for
: certain..

Theodicy (tzadik vira lo) and choq should be handled with very similar
approached. In both cases, we are trying to make sense of something
bayond us. The only difference is whether we're trying to understand the
rules by which the Borei runs the universe(s) vs the rules He gives us
by which to run our lives.

Given that...

RYBS calls his forays into ta'amei hamitzvos "halchic hermeneutics". IOW,
not "mishoreshei hamitzvah" (as the Chinuch calls them) but "merely"
lessons one can take away from the mitzvah and its performance.

I think the same approach is necessary here. We have an obligation to
learn from what we experience. That doesn't mean that what we learn is
necessarily *the reason* for the event.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

At 01:37 AM 6/5/01 +0300, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
>The above is an example of very problematic stretching. If the Mishna
>Berura and others cited in that letter had in fact the status of Sanhedrin

It is only a problem if one is very simplistic and literal.

>I would appreciate your explanation of how the Chasam Sofer's ruling that
>you cited is relevant to the case under discussion where someone claims
>that the circumstances have changed and thus the ruling of the Chazon Ish
>is not applicable. Or where a competent rav has decided - after his own
>evaluation of the facts that he has a different psak than the Chazon Ish.

I feel that I have explained myself sufficiently and that we are treading 
water.

1. That "someone" must first prove that the psak was based on pure 
"circumstance" and not on the halachic process of text, analysis and 
conclusion. It was the  a priori assumption that indeed, the psak was based 
on circumstance, that reminded me of positivist-historical analysis.

2. Once more, I never disagreed with the "competent Rav" bit.

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

>                                  However, there is one interesting point
> to be gleaned here and that is that even a Torah Mandated Halacha may be
> rabbinically legislated away if societal evolution demands it.

There isn't a "Torah Mandated" obligation to do it -- so there isn't a
problem to *not* do it.

Akiva

On Tue, Jun 05, 2001 at 05:32:44PM +0200, Akiva Atwood wrote:
:>                                  However, there is one interesting point
:> to be gleaned here and that is that even a Torah Mandated Halacha may be
:> rabbinically legislated away if societal evolution demands it.

: There isn't a "Torah Mandated" obligation to do it -- so there isn't a
: problem to *not* do it.

As opposed to the gemara's question WRT the permissability of pruzbul.
According to Rashi's understanding of Rava's answer, Hillel could set
up pruzbul even if he held that shemittah bizman hazeh is di'Oraisa.
(Rava answered that Hillel used hefker beis din to reassign the money
back to the loveh.)

Heter iska is another such example.

What makes such cases different in general is that at least one of the two
apply:

1- It is "only" the ta'am hamitzvah, not the letter of the din, that is
   being violated.

2- Or the situation changed sufficiently for the original halachah does
   not to apply. Even though it looks superficially to be the same case.

#1 is a manifestation of another idea we've discussed here more than
once. The translation of a Torah ethic into behavior that isn't mandated
is going lifnim mishuras hadin. Here we're saying that there is value
to making the other choice. Not merely societal need, but what is most
in accordance with other Torah-based values (bein adam lachaveiro ones
often become "societal needs").

So, it can be reduced to yet another example of choosing not to be
machmir in one thing because it means also being meikil in something
more critical.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

> It seems to lack a fundemental sense of justice and right for 
> anyone to have such totality of control over another human 
> being, even if it IS a father over a daughter.

I don't profess to be any more "in touch" with the concept of kiddushei
ketana than others who have posted here, but statements like this make
me _very_ nervous. What makes a certain "sense of justice and right"
fundamental? The Torah, of course. Since the Torah includes this practice,
this practice is, by definition, just and right. Ascribing outside
worldviews to the Torah, rather than Torah views to the outside world
is a dangerous practice. The key is to develop a "sense of justice and
right" that would include a concept such as kiddushei ketana. I've not
been more successful than you at this, I'm afraid, but it's important to
recognize that the chesaron is in our preconceptions and their sources,
and to word our inquires accordingly...

> me _very_ nervous. What makes a certain "sense of justice and right"
> fundamental? The Torah, of course. Since the Torah includes this practice,
> this practice is, by definition, just and right. Ascribing outside
> worldviews to the Torah, rather than Torah views to the outside world
> is a dangerous practice. The key is to develop a "sense of justice and
> right" that would include a concept such as kiddushei ketana....

Which leads us to the general issue - is there an ethic "outside"
of halacha. In it's weak sense the question may be seen in a case
(as discussed in a recent Navi shiur by R' Reisman) where A "buys"
a lottery ticket for B but B makes no kinyan. the ticket is a winner -
who gets the proceeds? If strict halacha says A, he seemed to argue(iiuc)
that this defines the ethical result. I would argue that it defines the
halachik result and that B has no taanot against A but that it would
be lfnim mshurat hadin an ethical thing for A to give B the winnings.
These ethics are usually learned much more from the aggadic literature
than the halachik literature, they don't override halacha(thus kidushei
ketana, if done, is overriding - but is it what we would advise if asked
for an eitza tova? similarly sotah overrides but do we advise one to
use the process?)

KT
Joel

>                    What makes a certain "sense of justice and right"
> fundamental? The Torah, of course. Since the Torah includes this practice,
> this practice is, by definition, just and right.

The Torah is right because the Torah defines right? It's
all arbitrary, HKBH had no guidelines in defining right
and wrong? You're invoking Euthythphro's dilemma. See
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol07/v07n044.shtml#04>

Also, you leave no room with which to define "kadeish es atzmecha bema
shemutar lach" (Ramban) or "neveilus bireshus haTorah". Clearly the
definition of "neveilus" is not identical to "assur".

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

Micha Berger wrote:
> In private email someone pointed me to Chullin 7b, "ein adam koeif 
> etzba'o...

> So as I see it, the question is how can so many rishonim argue with
> what is befeirush in the gemara?

To add to that, see Berachos 5b where Rav Huna lost a lot of money and 
complained to his colleagues.  They told him to examine his deeds.  He asked if 
they were being choshed him.  They asked him he was being choshed HKBH for being
unjust.

According to the Rambam, what is the question of the colleagues?  Maybe Rav Huna
was not thinking about HKBH at that time and the accident was caused by nature.

There are many gemaras that seem to contradict the Rambam's idea, as R. Ya'akov 
Elman pointed out in his article in the Orthodox Forum book on suffering.
     
Gil Student

I wrote:
> Why isn't hashgachah kelalis also sechar ve'onesh?
     
Moshe Feldman wrote:
> Hashgacha klalis means that one is subject to nature. People die in 
> earthquakes, building collapses, etc. all over the world. When people are 
> subject to hashgacha klalis, Hashem (directly) does not cause them, or not 
> cause them, their misfortune.

Hashgachah *koleles*, however, refers to the direct divine providence of a 
group.  An aspect of this is when the group is punished by having individuals 
who are part of this group suffer.

See, for example, Sefer HaIkkarim 4:12 (Chorev ed. pp. 484-485), 4:13 (pp. 
489-490).  This is also mentioned explicitly (but briefly) in Or Hashem but I 
don't have the references handy.
     
Gil Student

From: gil.student@citicorp.com [mailto:gil.student@citicorp.com]
> Hashgachah *koleles*, however, refers to the direct divine providence of a 
> group.  An aspect of this is when the group is punished by having individuals 
> who are part of this group suffer.

I agree to the concept of hashgacha koleles if (1) the group spoken of is
klal yisrael, which is subject to hashgacha pratis, or (2) if the group
consists of individuals who are subject to hashgacha pratis.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

From: "Stein, Aryeh E." <aes@ll-f.com>
> Of course we have to take it to heart, and onesh is not divine vengence
> but punishment and a call to do teshuva. However, we don't have neviim to
> "tell us *exactly* what we need to be mesaken." We can guess, and with
> the advice of gedolim, we can hopefully guess correctly, but we will
> never know for certain..

Beit Din also had no Neviim to tell them "exactly" what needed Tikun.
Nevertheless, as the Rambam (Taanis 1:17) writes, they reacted to Tzarot
by investigating the deeds of the Klal to see what needed Tikun in THEIR
opinion, and by taking steps to implement corrections. In all fairness,
however, my impression from learning the Sugya (or perhaps from a Chazal
story) was that Beit Din did not wish to hear from Reuven, regarding
the aveirot of Shimon. Which brings to mind the Musar Vort attributed
to the Brisker Rav regarding the words of Chazal: Ain Ben Dovid Ba Ad
She'Yehay HaDor Kulo Zakkai O Kulo Chayav. The Brisker Rav (is reputed
to have) said that most people think this (circa 1950 ?) Dor is closer
to Kulo Chayav but in reality, we are much closer to Kulo Zakkai, since
the "Frya" are not responsible for their behavior for Tinok SheNishba
reasons. Therefore, it is we, the "Fruma" who are holding the Dor back
from being Kulo Zakkai, by not being good enough.

So in the end, it is (always) we who must single-handedly bear the
responsibility and burden of keeping the torch burning.

Stuart Goldstein

(From HM:)
>> for the minor to get out of it if she so chooses yet the Torah does not
>> allow for it."


From: "Allen Baruch" <Abaruch@lifebridgehealth.org>
> Could be then (we have to say) that "Civlity and common sense" are 
> wrong?

Sometimes, but not in this case. Chazal seemed to feel the same way and
"Civlity and common sense" is probably why they invented "Miyun" for a
Ketana in identical circumstsnces that are M'Drabbonan, i.e., Kedushei
Ketana by a mother or brother after the death of a father.

> This is not to say that we cannot / have not descended to such depths
> that Chazal will not enact takanos to save us from ourselves.

I don't think that this is the case by "Miyun".

HM

From: gil.student@citicorp.com [mailto:gil.student@citicorp.com]
> To add to that, see Berachos 5b where Rav Huna lost a lot of money and
> complained to his colleagues. They told him to examine his deeds. He asked
> if they were being choshed him. They asked him he was being choshed HKBH
> for being unjust.

> According to the Rambam, what is the question of the colleagues? Maybe
> Rav Huna was not thinking about HKBH at that time and the accident was
> caused by nature.

Assuming Rav Huna was on the level that he generally was subject to
hashgacha pratis (and BTW, my guess is that most rishonim disagree with
Rambam as to what that level is, or what is required; remember that Rambam
here was following his theory that hashgacha pratis is linked to knowledge
of Hashem -- as opposed to tzidkus or merely the propensity to examine one's
acts in the aftermath of suffering), then the colleagues' question was:
(1) if this was a result of hashgacha pratis, examine your deeds as to
why you were punished; (2) if this wasn't a result of hashgacha pratis,
then examine your deeds as to why you did not merit hashgacha pratis.


From: Feldman, Mark [mailto:MFeldman@CM-P.COM]
> I agree to the concept of hashgacha koleles if (1) the group spoken of is
> klal yisrael, which is subject to hashgacha pratis, or (2) if the group
> consists of individuals who are subject to hashgacha pratis.

I just wanted to clarify: the hashgacha pratis refers to the individuals
being punished. I could imagine under situation #2 a case where a group
consists of some people who are subject to hashgacha pratis and some
who aren't and those who aren't are the ones who suffer.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

From: Shlomo Godick [mailto:shlomog@mehish.co.il]
> A talmid chacham in Rechasim informed me that the chiyuv of 
> tochachah holds, even when one suspects it will not be heeded,
> when the issur is an issur d'oraissa which is explicitly stated in
> the Torah.  In other words, we say "mutav sh'yihyu shog'gin 
> v'al yihyu m'zidin"  only in the case of  issurim d'oraissah that 
> are not explicit and are derived from a  limud, or, of 
> course, issurim d'rabbanan.

The second sentence is correct, but the first sentence does not necessarily
follow from the second sentence.  As I noted on Sunday, in his article in
the RJJ Journal No 25 (Spring 1993), Rabbi Alfred Cohen summarizes: "if
there seems to be no chance that the rebuke will be effective, or might even
be counter-effective, the majority would counsel silence.  However, there is
a minority view which sees tochacha as necessary in order to remind the
public what the Torah view is, and that it has not been cancelled due to
neglect."

Mutav sh'yihyu shog'gin  v'al yihyu m'zidin is a reason not to fulfill the
mitzvah of tochacha.  The S"A paskens like the Rosh (IIRC in 608:2) that
Mutav... is not said if mefurash b'kra.  But (Rabbi A. Cohen notes that)
there are other reasons not to fulfill tochacha when it will not be heeded:
(1) it's possible that we don't do tochacha when this may be a lifnei iver
to cause the non-religious to hate us; compare RSZA's view that one should
offer a guest food, even though the guest will not make a bracha on it,
because otherwise he may hate religious Jews; (2) according to many, the
whole purpose of tochacha is l'hachzeero l'mutav, and there is no reason to
do tochacha when it's clear that they won't listen anyway; (3) we don't know
how to give tochacha nowadays.

Kol tuv,
Moshe


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To be posted soon on the Dor Revi'i website:
    www.dorrevii.org
    www.math.psu.edu/glasner/Dor4

dabeir el aharon v'amarta eilav b'ha'alotkha et ha-neirot:  Rashi comments:
    Why does the chapter of the menorah follow the chapter of the
    princes? Because when Aharon saw how the princes participated in the
    dedication of the Tabernacle he was disturbed that neither he nor
    his tribe was with them at the dedication. The Holy One Blessed Be He
    therefore said to him, "By your life, your position is greater than
    theirs, because you will kindle and care for the lamps of the menorah,"

This is very amazing. Who prevented Aharon from participating in the
dedication of the altar? Was it not purely out of the goodness of
their heart that the princes brought offerings? Not because they were
commanded to do so by the Eternal. Nor did Moshe know that the Eternal
would accept the offerings of the princes until He told him so. So if
Aharon's heart did not move him to bring a sacrifice of his own, was
it appropriate for him to be upset with the Eternal? And why then was
the Eternal so quick to assuage Aharon's feelings by telling him that
he would kindle the lamps of the menorah? Moreover, what is so special
about this particular task that He would say "your position is greater
than theirs"? See the commentary of the Ramban on this.

But it appears to our master to explain that it is customary that
when a king honors his subjects by coming to visit and meet with them
in one of their towns that the townspeople, in turn, bring him some
offering of respect and receive him in a festive ceremony. This is what
the princes of Israel did of their own accord by bringing sacrifices
that they themselves donated in order to honor the G-d of Israel who
placed his Sanctuary in their midst (in the same manner as the Midrash
Rabbah describes at the beginning of poroshat Emor). However, it is not
appropriate for the ministers and officers of the king who serve him at
all times to bring him any offering at the moment when they come with
him to visit his subjects. Moreover, the subjects also give honor to
the ministers and officers out of respect to the king.

It was therefore not possible for Aharon and his tribe to join with the
princes, who came as representatives of the entire people, in bringing
offerings to the Eternal. For they were chosen by the Eternal to stand
before Him to serve Him, and, in performing their duties in the Sanctuary,
are considered the agents of the Merciful One. Aharon thus became
envious of the princes, the leaders of the Children of Israel, because
they were given the opportunity to give honor to the most honored King,
while he, just because he was a priest of the G-d Most High, could bring
Him nothing.

The Eternal cured his disappointment and gave him the commandment
to kindle the menorah. And this corresponds to the end of the parable
found in the Midrash Rabbah to poroshat Emor, for when the visiting king
gratefully sees the honor with which his subjects have received him,
he reciprocates and, as befits a king, bestows his own gifts upon them.
Now it is the minister of the king, the one in charge of his household who
is responsible for informing the people that the king wishes to honor them
in return. This is what the Eternal did through Aharon when he kindled
the lamps of the menorah. He showed the people that the Eternal would
shine His countenance upon them for their good. As it is written in the
Midrash Rabbah, "does the Eternal require the light of the menorah? Rather
the menorah is lit to make it known that the Divine Presence dwells within
Israel." For just as when the Eternal is angered to uproot a man from the
land, He hides his face from him, as it is written (Deuteronomy 31:18):
"And I will surely hide my face from them," the light of His countenance
contains life, favor, and kindness. And when He lifts up His countenance
to them it is a sign that He seeks their peace and their well-being.

And this is the meaning of what the Eternal said to Aharon "your position
is greater than theirs," because Aharon is the one who goes before the
Eternal with a pillar of fire to inform the people all the good that the
Eternal has promised to do for them and to tell the Children of Israel
that G-d is gracious unto them and they will enjoy all the goodness of
the earth. v'doq

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

To be posted soon on the Dor Revi'i website
    www.dorrevii.org
    www.math.psu.edu/glasner/Dor4

va-yomru ha-anashim ha-heimah eilav anahnu t'mei'im l'nephesh adam
lamah nigara l'vilti haqriv et qorban ha-Sheim b'mo'ado b'tokh b'nei yisrael:  

See Rashi and the Sifri who say that the ritually unclean ones were asking 
only to have blood sprinkled upon them by the priests.  And they interpret 
the verse in this way, because otherwise why would they have asked such 
a question ("why should we be held back" (lamah nigara)) from our G-d?

But to our master the matter appears simple since in the chapter 
concerning the bringing of the qorban pesah on the fourteenth of Nissan 
the Scripture writes (Numbers 9:3): "ye shall keep it in its appointed 
season" (ta'assu oto b'moado), from which the Sages deduce that the 
qorban pesah is brought even on the Sabbath and even if the people are 
ritually unclean.  Now Moshe and the elders of Israel already knew this 
chapter before they were taught the law of Pesah Sheini, but they did not 
yet know the difference between the entire congregation (tzibur) and a 
single individual (yahid).  It was this point that the ritually unclean men 
were disputing with Moshe, and they asked: "why should we be too few 
so as not to bring the offering of the L-rd in its appointed season among 
the children of Israel" (lamah nigara livilti haqriv et qorban ha-Sheim 
b'mo'ado b'tokh b'nei yisrael)?   For the reason that the Scripture wrote 
"b'mo'ado" was to teach us that the qorban pesah is brought when the 
congregation is ritually unclean, and if so why should we be considered 
too few to bring the qorban pesah?  And Moshe did not yet comprehend 
the matter fully, so he said to them (Numbers 9:8): "Stay ye, that I may 
hear what the L-rd will command concerning you."  v'doq ki hu kaphtor 
va-perah.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

To be posted soon on the Dor Revi'i website:
    www.dorrevii.org
    www.math.psu.edu/glasner/Dor4

v'ha-ish moshe anav mi-kol ha-adam asher al p'nei ha-adamah: 

Now in poroshat Noah it is written (Genesis 7:1): "for thee have I seen 
righteous before Me" (ki otkha ra'iti tzaddik l'phanai)  And Rashi 
commented
    It does not say here "perfectly righteous" (tzaddik tamim) as it does
    at the beginning of the poroshah; hence we infer that only a part of a
    person's good qualities are enumerated in his presence, but that in his
    absence all of his good qualities may be told.

Now here concerning Moshe who wrote the entire Torah, was this praise
not told entirely in his presence? And our master said that perhaps this
is why the word "anav" (humble) is written without the letter "yod"
so that it might be equally understood as "anui" (afflicted), because
Moshe our teacher, may peace be upon him, was the most afflicted of men,
for everyone searched to find fault with him. And even his own sister,
Miriam, spoke against him, which is obviously a great affliction.

v'ha-ish moshe anav mi-kol ha-adam asher al p'nei ha-adamah:

One may ask why Moshe surpassed all others in the character trait of
humility. And it appears to our master to explain this according to the
words of the prophet (Jeremiah 9:22-23): "Let not the wise man glory in
his wisdom, Neither let the mighty man glory in his might, Let not the
rich man glory in his riches; But let him that glorieth glory in this,
That he understandeth, and knoweth Me." For only one who is enlightened to
seek the Deity and to know the sublime knowledge is fit to be glorified
and praised. But not so for the one who is wise or mighty or rich, for
these are all the gift of G-d. And when the prophet concludes "For in
these things I delight, saith the Lord," he meant to say that it is by
the will of G-d that the wise man became wise, the mighty man mighty
and the rich man rich.

Now we have already cited the Ran in his twelve drashot that the level
to which Moshe our teacher ascended to know the Eternal face to face
was not owing to any preparation of his own. For it is not within human
capacity to rise up to so great an achievement, which was impossible
without the aid of the Eternal. And the Eternal elevated Moshe to this
level only out of the necessity that the Torah be given through him.
Moshe's greatness was thus a gift from the Almighty. (See what we have
written concerning this in poroshat Balaq). Moshe therefore did not
even take glory from his knowledge and understanding of the Eternal,
because it was given to him entirely from the hand of the Eternal.
And that is why he was the most humble of all men.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

********************


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