Avodah Mailing List

Volume 06 : Number 087

Friday, December 29 2000

• Re: Talit and 'atifa
• RE: menorah lighting
• Re: menorah lighting
• RE: menorah lighting
• Re: menorah lighting
• Re: zemer lechanuka
• RE: Chassidim and Z'man Tefilah
• Sevara for chazakah
• RE: Tolerance
• Re: Talit and 'atifa
• re:hair as das moshe etc.
• Re: hair covering as a das yehudis or a das moshe
• RE: dat Yehudit
• Re: menorah lighting
• RE: menorah lighting
• Rambam, Hilchos Mamrim 2:1 - Re: Dor Revi'i and TSBP
• Dinei DeRabbanan - Re: Dor Revi'i and TSBP

R' Micha wrote:
> Not "tallaisim", "tallisos" or "talliyos"! ...                  Take
> talleisim vs tallisos, since I raised that example. I'm sure, without
> even knowing what it is, that one could find significant Torah in the
> fact that this cheftzah shel mitzvah is named bilashon nekeivah. Perhaps
> there is a whole world of meaning and kavanah hiding behind this little
> grammatical quibble.

I agree that talit is considered lashon nekeiva and in Hebrew the plural
is talitot or taliyot. As R' Micha said, taleisim is Yiddish (just as
Shabbosim is acceptable Yiddish). If the original poster was using a
Yiddish term and not a Hebrew one R' Micha's "correction" was meant
only to point out that "perhaps there is world of meaning and kavana
hiding..." in the lashon nekeiva.

My comment is that we say "talit shekulAH tekhelet but also speak of talit
katan and talit gadol not ketana and gedola. This shows that there is
ambiguity in usage as to the sex of the talit in Hebrew. I don't think
one can argue successfully that the katan and gadol refer to the size
of the wearer rather than the size of the talit.

As to 'atifa by mimetics vs. modern guide books and picture books:

I think the guide and picture makers demonstrate another example of how,
as time passes and we lose touch with the source, it becomes difficult
to understand the original intent of texts. The early sources, up to
the Beit Yosef, (but not in the S"A,) mention that, during 'atifa,
one is to mekhaseh 'ad hapeh k'derekh haYishmaelim.

Anyone who has seen Yishmaelim wrapped up should realize that the one
place they do not cover is at least part of the face that lets them see
where they're going. Look at the Fatah marching on TV. Evidently, covering
up to (or below or above) the mouth meant taking one side of the garment
and wrapping it around the chest and neck and covering the chin up to
the mouth. Somehow, among many Ashkenazim, this later became covering
from the head down to the mouth, the opposite of the original meaning.
BTW, the term "many Ashkenazim" above does not include Chabad and some
other chasidic groups who cover from the bottom up. The Sefardim also
cover "up to" rather than "down to" the mouth. Interesting enough,
the variants of "below the mouth" or "above the mouth" are actually
switching chumras into kulas or vice versa.

Of course the machmirim do two 'atifas, one each way, and thus cover
all possible bases. (Is running around from third to second to first
etc. also defined as a home run?)

And there is still what to say historically about whether all four
tzitziot should be on the left side or in back over the left shoulder.

One should also note how the immigrants from Ethiopia, both male and
female, wore, upon arrival at least, a rectangular talit-shaped garment
(without tzitzit). Just as we are told is proper, when cold they cover
their heads and wrap it around their bodies and when warm they remove
from the head and lift it on to the shoulders, as we do, which puts the
four corners at 90 degrees from each other. We do it as proper mitzva
observance. They do it because that is the normal way of dress of the
entire population in the "old country".

IIRC, the GR"A says any shitta of 'atifa justifies the b'rakha and
kiyyum hamitzva.

As one who does not go down the up escalator, I haven't been stringing
you along. I am not, however, recommending to anyone that he change his
established minhag.

K"T,
David

> Could it be, however, that the neis pach ha'shemen was considered less
> important than the neis of the war?

I would add (to avoid the more important/less important chiluk) that the
potential chiyuv of hallel by Purim is based on a k"v of mavdus l'cheirus
amru shira mmisa l'chayim lo kol shekain, similarly by Chanukah the nes
of shemen was l'shem hiddur (Pnei Yehoshua) and would not alone be a
sufficient mecahyev of hallel v'hoda'ah, only the milchama which posed
a life-threatening dangerc is; therefore it is only the milchama which
is mentioned in our hoda'ah.

Tefillah has its own set of rules, e.g. the Mishna in Berachos says that
if you say 'ad kan tzippor yageyu rachamecha' while davening it indicates
minus, yet the Rambam in Moreh explains the reason for the mitzva of
kan tzippor is G-d's mercy. The teirutz is the Mishna is a special
din in tefillah and not a rule in kol haTorah kula of what is minus.
Another example: they were called Anshei Kenneses HaGedolah because they
restored saying 'gadol gibor v'nora' to tefillah post churban - chas
v'shalom to say that Daniel and Yirmiyahu doubted the gadlus and gevurah
of Hashem - it was a special din that al pi nevuah they felt it was not
supposed to be part of tefillah, and the AnK"H re-established it. If
'al hanissim' has no mention of the nes hashemen, it seems to me that we
should ascribe this to a special quality of tefillah that is not mecahyev
it being mentioned (and lav davka my hesber, as there are others).

-Chaim B.

On Thu, Dec 28, 2000 at 11:27:48PM +0200, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
: Could it be, however, that the neis pach ha'shemen was considered less
: important than the neis of the war because we didn't really need the pach
: ha'shemen? After all, there's the famous kashya of tuma dchuya b'tzibur
: and why did they really need tahor oil?

Or perhaps because only people who were permitted to enter the heichal
were able to see the neis. A small cadre of people. In the Kuzari's eyes,
this would certainly be minor, think of the importance he assigns to the
number of witnesses of ma'amud Har Sinai. This makes the neis with the
oil very different than the kinds of events we usually celebrate.

-mi

Micha Berger
>:> Q: If the neis Hanukkah was the miracle of the oil, then why no mention
>:> until the Gmoro in Shabbas?

> Yet another answer: there was mention -- in megillas ta'anis. Perhaps
> Rebbe only codified those dinim that weren't already codified elsewhere.

Note: The Vanilla Megllas Taanis does mention that Hanukkah is a
holiday, of course. However, The Hebrew parts of Megillas Taanis are
of later origin. The passage re: the miracle of the oil is considered
grafted onto the original text.

Shalom and Regards,
Rich Wolpoe
Richard_Wolpoe@ibi.com

On Fri, Dec 29, 2000 at 09:30:00AM -0500, Wolpoe, Richard wrote:
:> Yet another answer: there was mention -- in megillas ta'anis. Perhaps
:> Rebbe only codified those dinim that weren't already codified elsewhere.
: 
: Note: The Vanilla Megllas Taanis does mention that Hanukkah is a
: holiday, of course. However, The Hebrew parts of Megillas Taanis are
: of later origin. The passage re: the miracle of the oil is considered
: grafted onto the original text.

I need more explanation, I didn't get what you're saying.

I can't tell if you're saying that Chanukah was in the original, and the
neis shemen of Chanukah is part of a hebrew graft? Or is it that there
were two additions, one adding Chanukah in Hebrew, and yet another graft
that discusses the neis shemen?

Second problem that I'm facing, when did hadlakas haneiros make it into
Megillas Ta'anis (MT)? The same time as the miracle, or did it predate it?

As I see it, there are really two questions relevent to my suggestion
about the lack of a discussion of Chanukah (not just a single oblique
reference) in the mishnah:
- When Rebbe compiled the mishnah, was the mitzvah of hadlakas haneiros
  in the MT yet?
- If not, was Chanukah itself?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

On Wed, Dec 27, 2000 at 12:35:49PM -0500, MPoppers@kayescholer.com wrote:
:> I think another or perhaps more primary meaning may be that this
:> reference to the Bais haMikdash refers to hatavas hanairos which took
:> place . . . Be-chol yom pa'amayim--twice daily.

: The hatavah took place twice _daily_? ...                         the
: connotation of this phrase is that, like the t'midim (or k'rias Sh'ma),
: there was a large timespan between the two activities, while the two
: hatavos on YhK were both "babokair" and not separated to a great extent....

Is the time it takes for zerikas dam hatamid long enough? In which case,
we could be talking about hatavas 5 neiros and hatavas 2 neiros.

-mi

Micha Berger
>: Chassidim place great emphasis on hachana l'tefillah, especially
>: learning before davening and this is given as the primary reason for
>: davening after z'man tefilah.

> I suggested that the reason for this is based on what RYGB later wrote up
> as the fork in the Chassidish-Misnagdish road.

> A chassid, however, is going to be looking at how to maximize d'veikus.
> And that comes more from kavanah than davening bizman. Therefore, when
> a conflict between the two arises, they are more likely to choose being
> meikil on z'man than davening hurridly or without mental preparation.

I read once about R. Nachman Of Breslov that a Chasid came to him because
he could not get up at midnight to say Tikkun Chatzos - so what should
he do?

R. Nachman asked: "When CAN you get up?. 
"4:00 AM," he replied
So R. Nachman suggested: "for you 4:00 AM IS chatzos. Say the Tikkun then"

AIUI, the halacha re: zmanei tefillah is OBJECTIVE for misnagdim but
SUBJECTIVE for {some} Hassidim.

If you think about it, uv'kumecha CAN be seen as subjective. This might
have halachic implications for people working night shifts etc.

Now I am clueless as the source of this Hassidic hashkafa of subjective
time. Yet it does seem a somewhat consistent theme at least wrt Tefillah.

Good Hanukkah
Rich Wolpoe

On Thu, Dec 28, 2000 at 10:18:40AM -0500, Wolpoe, Richard wrote:
: A: Sometimes we are tempted to assume a Chazakah. That since we do
: things NOW for reason X it was ALWAYS that way.

In general, humans assume that things don't change in their absence.
Chazakah is part of our normal perception of the world. For example,
say you sit with someone in a room, leave, and return after a number
of hours. Isn't the common reaction, "I can't believe they're still
sitting there!"? Of course, you may check if they left and returned,
but our instinctive stance is that of status quo. Change suprises us,
despite how frequent it is.

Going back (my apologies to the chevrah) to my statement in "ta'am and
taste", I believe that halachah addresses reality as perceived, not an
objective reality.

In the case of chazakah dimei'ikara she'i efshar livareir, we can't get
into issues of "well, he ought to check" -- i efshar. So the only thing
we can pasken on is how he will relate to that unknown. Chazakah -- the
assumption that nothing changes -- is how people do relate.

I can't address ika rei'usa yet, though.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

Feldman, Mark:
> I disagree with the view that one of the two views must be wrong.  I believe
> that the concept of elu v'elu divrei elokim chayim leads to the conclusion
> that both views--though contradictory--are emes.  (Most of the rest of this
> post appeared a year and a half ago.)
...
> I think that it's much easier to be tolerant if you believe that each of the
> darchei haavodah is emes.  In fact, in some respects, many people
> intuitively believe this: many yeshivaleit will agree that chasidim have a
> valid derech of avodas Hashem.

Echoing RMF's sentiments... eilu v'eilu works because we are all engaged
in the same PROCESS of investigating Torah even though we arrive at
differing conclusions (i.e. product).

The ikkar is the "eisek" in "divrei sorah", and this process not only
leads different people to different concussions, the process itself
requires an element of interaction and discussion to refine the insight.
Torah study is not done like an academic scholar in total solitude,
rather it is by nature is communal and societal. Lilmod, ulellamed,
lishmor, vlaasos.

BTW, this dovetails well re: my haskafa re: halachah. Society has to have
standards of observance, so halacha/hanhaga within a community ideally
should be uniform. How could we have kashurs otherwise? How could we
all daven together otherwise? OTOH, we all are free to understand the
meaning of what we do and how we learn Torah slightly differently.

Shalom and Regards,
Rich Wolpoe
Richard_Wolpoe@ibi.com

David wrote:

> Of course the machmirim do two 'atifas, one each way, and thus cover all 
> possible bases. (Is running around from third to second to first etc. also 
> defined as a home run?)

I was told by someone who does both, that he does it not out of chumra but so as
not to deviate too much from the accepted custom and be min hamatmihim.

Gil Student

At 09:26 PM 12/28/00 +0000, Sadya N Targum wrote:
>> R' Moshe (IM EH 1:57) holds that it is mandatory that all women who are
>> married or have been married cover their hair. ...
>> a woman *currently unmarried*, since the obligation is "only" a Mitzvas
>> Aseh, like all other Mitzvos Aseh, one is not required to spend more
>> than one-fifth of one's wealth to fulfill that Aseh.

> This is a tremendous chidush, is it not?  First, RMF is equating not
> earning to spending.... Further, if it is only an aseh that hair be covered
>( ... ), shouldn't it follow that the standard for a previously married
> woman be merely that there be a hair covering, but not that no hair be
> uncovered, since the aseh is then fulfilled?
>Sadya N. Targum

I agree RMF's chiddush is quite significant, but that is not the nidon at 
moment. Perhaps more parallels are in order?

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

At 03:07 AM 12/29/00 -0500, Michael J Broyde wrote:
>Rabbi Bechhoffer writes:
>> I am somewhat surprised by RMJB's forgetfulness of  the concept of
>> "b'ividetei torid" which is the basis of the heter for a woman to be
>> examined by a male doctor, and several other normally inappropriate forms
>> of gazing and touching. Let me helpfully refer you to the Shach YD 195:20,
>> and to a very good discussion of the matter - including our Ritva - in the
>> Nishmas Avrohom there pp.110-115. The standard of tzeni'us is constant and
>> unchanging - the heter here is narrow and specific.

>I think this concept is exactly correct, which is that context (in this
>case, the utter absence of sexual context) permits the revealing of body
>parts. Surely you recognize that this heter is not a limited on, but a
>general one, that allows conduct for afield from medical procedures.  For
>example Iggrot Moshe EH 2:14 invokes this concept to allow travel on a
>crowed subway where people bump, press and grind without any sexual (or
>medical) connotation at all -- all based on this Shach.  The heter is not
>"narrow and specific" as Rabbi Bechhoffer posits, but allows for direct
>physical contact.

Again:

Direct physical contact is an interaction issue (let us, arbitrarily, call 
that the "cheftza").

Attire is a personal obligation (again, arbitrarily, let us call that the 
"gavra").

All the sources of "b'ividetei torid" correlate to the cheftza, what a man 
may see or touch in the course of performing professional, impersonal 
duties or activities.

None refer to the gavra, how the woman may dress or undress in public.

We have not yet seen one source that applies the Ritva et al to the gavra, 
only to the cheftza.

>To quote Rabbi Feinstein "in the context of touching and pressing women
>[in the subway, by accident] there is no prohibition since this is not in
>the manner of sexual gratification or arousal (tava vechiba) and all
>touching of people who are prohibited to marry are -- even according to
>the Rambam who rules sexual touching a a torah violation -- is limited to
>cases of touching or sexual gratification."

Kana"l.

>Thus, this heter, like the Ritva cited in the pitchai teshuva, is limited
>to (and I agree) cases where there can be no sexual overtones -- but I
>posit that the rules for attire and the rules for interactions are subject
>to the same set of guidelines, and the same set of strictures and
>leniencies.  Nothing more and nothing less.  You posited that they are
>different, and I see this as an example of them being the same.

I missed the example. Where is the example that relates to the gavra?

>Rabbi Bechhoffer poses a fascinating question about the relationship
>between my limud zechus and my own answering of shealos, and I will post
>an answer to that question soon, but now I am still knee deep in the
>sources!

I did have some words I would like to put into your mouth, but will 
refrain, since you promise to deal with it yourself.

>I think haircovering is different, in that the amount of matzah one eats
>does not vary based on location, but the amount of hair (after the torah
>requirement is met) one must cover (the das yehudis) can.  Maharam
>Alshaker 35 does not give a measurement, which one can quibble with.
>Rather, he states that in locations where the norm is to uncover some hair
>it is mutar to do so, and in places where the norm is not to uncover, it
>is assur to do so.  This is not like Rav Chaim Naheh and the Chazon ish
>arguing about what is a kezayit.  Maharam Alshakar thinks that this matter
>is dependent on local custom.

Voss is der chilluk?

In Yerushalayim you eat matzo like Minhag Yerushalayim (RCN); in Bnei Braq 
you eat matzo like the Chazon Ish - asra d'mar v'asra d'mar.

MA never said total covering/uncovering is dependent on custom: Only how 
much can escape the covering.

>Rabbi Bechhoffer then writes:
>> R' Moshe notes that for currently married women the chiyuv is d'orysah.
>> There is, in the d'orysah, a safek if the chiyuv is an aseh or lav. If it
>> is a lav, then no makom hefsed can serve as a heter, while if it is an
>> aseh, then makom hefsed can serve as a *limited* (note his stricture in 
> the
>> teshuva in EH 4:32 you cited!) heter. Since safek d'orysa l'chumra, a
>> married woman has no room for leniency (as I write this, I am becoming
>> totally bewildered as to how you possibly can use the IM as the basis for
>> even a limud zechus for currently married women. You seem to be burning
>> some candle out there at both ends).
>
>I do not think in even the vaguest way that Rav Moshe is the slightest
>form of a limud zechut for married women not to cover their hair -- such a
>proposition is silly.  Rav Moshe is, however, quite source for supporting
>the proposition that rabbinically required forms of modesty are dependent
>on the norms of society.  Rav Moshe is quite clear that fully uncovered
>hair is not one of the rabbinically directed forms of modesty, at all.
>Unmarried women's hair is, and Rav Moshe is prepared to permit women who
>are covered by the das yehudis obligation to uncover.  Thus, in IM EH 4:32
>he permits a divorcee to uncover, and the same rationale is used by Rabbi
>Willig to permit partial uncovering (and is noted by IM also as a grounds
>for partial uncovering (although he gives others).  All that I desire to
>note is that das yehudis uncovering is quite different than das moshe
>uncovering.  (This then nicely dovetails into my limud zechut, which notes
>that the Shulchan Aruch itself classifies even full uncovering as merely a
>das yehudis.)

At best, seems to me, your limud zechus based on RMF can only succeed in 
downgrading the impropriety of a currently unmarried woman from a d'orysa 
to a d'rabbonon.

>Rabbi Bechhoffer then adds:
>> From my perspective, you are stuck in orbit in a universe of your own
>> making. You are convinced that distinctions between DM and DY are
>> meaningful across the board and are therefore intent on sticking to that
>> dichotomy even though it is almost never relevant.
>
>I think, on the other hand, that the DM/DY distinction is critical, as Das
>yehudis obligations have a component of the subjective.
>
>Rabbi Bechhoffer then adds:
>> I am reminded here of a story I think I once told here, that the
>> former Rosh Yeshiva of Sha'alvim was once asked by a young couple in
>> Mishmar Ayalon if he would teach them all Hil. Nidda d'orysa, but
>> nod'rabbonons, as they would consider keeping the former, but not the
>> latter. The RY asked RSZA if he might do accordingly, and RSZA ruled
>> negatively. It was RSZA's response that is emblazoned on my memory:
>> Whether the source is d'orysa or d'rabbonon is irrelevant. We have (in
>> halacha l'ma'aseh) one Torah, and it cannot be cut in two. (I assume
>> this falls under the rubric of what RHS brands "ziyuf ha'Torah".

>Whatever the merits of this story, tzinuyot matters are different, as they
>are intrinsically subjective, and while th deorayso/derabban distinction
>is not relavent, the subjectice/objective distinction is!  Thus, one
>cannot teach about the practical laws of a man not wearing a woman's
>garments (a torah prohibition) without noting that it has a subjective
>component.  Das Yehudis (which can even be torah prohibitions, in the
>sense of lo toteru) nonetheless have a society and contextual
>component.  That is the exact notion advanced by Rama in EH 21:5.  Thus,
>to me das moshe/da yehudis distinctions are not torah/rabbinic but rather
>objective/subjective, which we all recognize as crucial in the real world.
>Objectifying the subjective leads to sin, as it produces undo leniency.
>Subjectifying the objective leads to sin, as it produces leinincy too.

Again, this is our impasse (BTW, I note with raised eyebrows your first 
sentence above. Perhaps the spirit of the story *is* part of our contentions!):

I maintain that you have not proven that the gavra halachos of EH 21 are 
ever subjective - only that there are limited situations where one need not 
abide by their parameters, a Hefsed Merubbeh kind of Heter (like RMF). All 
your arguments are based on the cheftza halachos, and are not transferable.

>Thus, the orbit that I am stuck in, is the orbit that I see as dictated by
>the halacha itself, from which one cannot escape even by being an
>objectivist, as that too leads to sin. Things that are modest in one
>society are immodest in another, and the reverse too.  Thus, we must
>always look at a modesty prohibition to determine whether it is objective
>or subjective.  Objective ones do not change, and subjective ones do.
>Full hair uncovering is an objective issur according to almost all
>concemporary poskim (but not, if I am reading it correctly, the Shulchan
>Aruch).

>In my view, by the way, the objective/subjective distinction in hilchot
>tzinuyot is neither strict not lenient.  Thus, according to Rabbi
>Bechhoffer's analysis, even if society as a whole returned to viewing hair
>as erotic, and all modest gentile women covered all their hair, it would
>not be a violation to reveal hair, according to those who permit hair
>revealing (like Maharam Alshakar and Iggort Moshe).  In my view this is
>wrong; no one permits hair to be revealed when it is deemed immodest.  The
>poskim who permitted partial hair to be revealed did so because they felt
>it was no longer immodest and it was not governed by the objective (das
>moshe) prohibition, but the subjective, das yehudis, one.

Right. I am actually more meikel than you - and the MA is on my side. 
According to you, if a Jewish woman lived in Iran she would be reqwuired to 
wear a head scarf; in Afghanistan, a veil. IIRC, the MA explicitly 
dismisses that notion, and with it, relativism - l'kulla and l'chumra.

The fact that, IRC, the Gemara bothers, in Berachos, to adduce a pasuk from 
Shir ha'Shirim to Sei'ar b'Isha Erva seems to weigh mightily in my favor.

>I will, bli neder, answer the question about the role of limud zechut in
>my own shaylas after shabbat...

Awaited!

Good Shabbos and Good Trip,

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

Rabbi Y. H. Henkin
> From time to time one of my friends or colleagues ...
> approach assumes that the achronim simply erred and overlooked or
> misunderstood basic texts that were before them.

> Such claims almost invariably are a result of a fundamental misreading
> of the sources by the claimant...

Several quick comments:

1) This is why I am opposed to revisionist halachic changes.
Halacha ideally should be basd upon precedents and not about novel
re-interpretations of texts and then going forward bypassing generations
of psak din. The exception would be a bona fide Sanhedrin which - aiui -
can revise halahca based upon original Sinaitic prinicples and taht such
a BD Hagadol need NOT defer to precedent. IOW it only needs defer to
Sinaitic mesorah NOT earlier psak. OTOH, if a Sanhedrin wants a stable
halacha, it will use this power with discretion, of course.

2) re: lamdus I have no objection to revisionist "theory" so long as it
remains theory and then is subjected to the scrutiny of a wide-range of
"daas torah". And there is a widely held premise amongst many yehsivos -
both rw and lw - that Rishonim knew something that Acharonim do not know.
My indiviudal experience is primarily focused upon the so-called Minhag
Ashkenaz which is based upon an old Oral/Mimetic Tradition. Regardless of
this detail, it seems that Rishonim had a meta-knowledge of Shas that
Acharonim don't seem to have - with a few exceptions.

Conclusion: going back to Rishonim to re-interpret a Gmoro is ok so far as
it goes but I would be wary of reivisng normative practice on this basis.
One exception would be if the halacha is STILL in flux.

Good Hanukkah
Rich Wolpoe     

> Neir ish ubeiso. The din is on the bayis, not the person (I originally 
> wrote "gavra", but it didn't seem to fit for a "she").
     
I heard R. Tzvi Berkowitz of NIRC speak last night at a wedding.  He noted that 
the intent of the misyavnim was to reject the tradition of Judaism.  That 
tradition is passed on mainly through the family which is why the mitzvah of 
hadlakas neiros was established for each household.

Gil Student

Micha Berger:
> I can't tell if you're saying that Chanukah was in the original, and the
> neis shemen of Chanukah is part of a hebrew graft? Or is it that there
> were two additions, one adding Chanukah in Hebrew, and yet another graft
> that discusses the neis shemen?

There are two layers of Megillas Taanis. The original "mishnaic" layer
and a later Gmoro type layer.

The first layer definitely has Hanukkah. But it does not elaobrate upon
it, just that it is 8 days w/o taanis.

> Second problem that I'm facing, when did hadlakas haneiros make it into
> Megillas Ta'anis (MT)? The same time as the miracle, or did it predate it?

> As I see it, there are really two questions relevent to my suggestion
> about the lack of a discussion of Chanukah (not just a single oblique
> reference) in the mishnah:
> - When Rebbe compiled the mishnah, was the mitzvah of hadlakas haneiros
>   in the MT yet?
> - If not, was Chanukah itself?

The 2nd layer expands upon Hanukkah with essentially the Mai Hanukkah
sugya from Shabbos 21. Virtually nobody considers this 2nd layer to
pre-date Rebbe. OTOH The first layer does pre-date Rebbe, of course,
because it pre-dates churban Bayis sheini.

I'm not sure why rebbe omitted dinei Hanukkah. The really simplest answer
is that the Mishna corresponds - albeit indirectly - to Tanach somehow.
So Purim is in, Hanukkah is out.

Godo Hanukkah
Rich Wolpoe

David Glasner wrote:
> I am still at a loss to understand how you read 2:1. 

[snip]

Gil Student wrote:
: Again, only dealing with new halachahs.

I am still puzzled by what you mean by new halakhot.  Are you calling all
halakhot derived through the 13 midot or other hermeneutical principles 
new halakhot?  Why call them new?  Some of the halakhot derived in this 
way are not in accord with the apparent p'shat of the p'sukim on which they 
are based.  According to you what was going on when they were first 
propounded by a Sanhedrin?  What would prevent a new Sanhedrin if it 
should come into existence (speedily in our days) from propounding new 
halakhot of its own?

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

> There are many dinei d'rabbanan that do not necessarily fall under the 
> category of g'zeirot and takanot or s'yagim

: Such as?

All divrei sofrim that were not given d'oraita status. Or say the laws
of muktza and aveilut. We also know that, in practice, the requirement
of greater hokhma and minyan is not always necessary in changing g'zeirot
and takanot d'rabbanan.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

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