Avodah Mailing List

Volume 02 : Number 067

Wednesday, December 2 1998

• [none]
• Re: Ten Jewish Women
• Re: Dor Revi'i on ayin tahat ayin
• Rambam on divrei sofrim
• Divrei Sofrim - Rambam
• Yeshivish
• Re: Yeshivish
• Chillul HaShem
• Re: choosing when to do a mitzvah
• Chillul Hashem
• emulation of avot

Subject: chillul hashem

R YGB writes

>> You did not address the source I quoted. Please do. Ssee Encyclopedia
>> Talmudit. Erech Chillul Hashem, fn 103.

I read over the article and did not see anything to support your position.
Basically the article points out that there are 2 sources of chillul hashem.
One is caused by doing a sin.
The second is more general and applies to a talmid chacham. Thus, any action
that a chacham takes that will cause others to emulate him in actions
that are not desirable may be chillul hashem.

Some examples are given by Chaim Wasserman

>> consider Yoma 86a where Rav felt that asking his butcher
>> for credit in the purchase of meat would be for him chillul Hashem. And Rav
>> Yochanan similarly indicated that four amos for him without Torah and tefillin
>> would be a chillul Hashem.

In all these cases the person is doing something that is improper, at least on
the level of lifnei meshurat hadin. There is no source that I know of
that applies chillul hashem to doing a mitzva in a situation that nonreligious
people don't approve of. Hence, if one believes that giving back land is
prohibited (lo techonen) there is no chillul hashem in insisting on this.

Of course as others have pointed out this needs to be done in the proper way
and through violence. But there is no requirement to move homes or give
back land based on chillul hashem among non-religious jews. Again, Rav David Cohen
states that giving back land in itself is a chillul hashem since it shows that
Israel is weak and pushed around by other countries.
The only grounds that I am aware of for giving back land are based on pikuach
Nefesh. This is the opinion of Rav Soloveitchik and Rav Ovadiah Yosef.
Rav Schach seems to go further and claim that any action that incites the
other nations is in violation of Pikuach nefesh, not chillul hashem.

kol tuv,
Eli Turkel

Richard K. Fiedler asks whether ten women constitute. I refer him to my
articles on Women and Minyan [Aryeh A. Frimer, "Women and Minyan,"
Tradition 23:4 (Summer 1988), pp. 54-77; Aryeh A. Frimer, "Ma'amad
haIsha beHalakha - Nashim uMinyan," Or haMizrah 34:1, 2 (Tishrei 5746),
pp. 69-86.] In which we cite eleven aharonim who indicate that 10 women
constitute a minyan for Kiddush hashem.

Elie Ginsparg wrote:

<<<
Once again I refer someone to the Book Dynamics of dispute becuase it
deals with these issues. Not having the book in hand I will cite from
memory that there is a difference between general rules and particulars.
It is very possible that Hashem told Moshe Eiyen tachas eiyen in money
but
not literal and didn't tell him how to asses the value. That was left to
beis din. So I don't follow how the fact that there are disputes in
details
challanges the premise that any law not disputed in shas (at least could
be--see why amoraim don't argue on taanaim) said from hashem to
moshe.
>>>

To uphold the Rambam's position, one clearly has to rely on a distinction
between the general rule and the particular, as you suggest.  The
question is whether that is a plausible way out of the problem.  The
Havot Yair in siman 192 rejects that explanation repeatedly in the course
of his t'shuva only to fall back on it in an almost desparing tone at the end
of the t'shuva, because he could see no other way out.  What is
problematic about the distinction?  I think it is this.  The basis for the
Rambam in defining a category of mi-pi hash'mua interpretations is the
midrash which says "kol ha-Torah ne'emrah klaloteha, u'phrateha,
v'dikdukeha mi-Sinai."  See the Rambam's Introduction to Zeraim.  If we
accept that Midrash as, in some sense, literally true, it does seem a bit
artificial to say that it really means just the klalot, but not the pratot and
the dikdukim.

<<<
Furthermore, how do we suggest that a different beis din ruled it was
meant literally-why didn't that opinion make it into any taanaic
literature. We can't negate the logic of the Rambam by supposing there
are
disputes which were never recorded.
>>>

See above.  If we have evidence of a mahloket among Chazal, then that
would be enough, under the Rambam's own criterion, to remove an
interpretation from the mi-pi ha-Shemua category.  If so, the burden of
proof shifts to the side that claims that there never was a contrary ruling
by any beit din.  On the other hand, you may, like the Havot Yair,
conclude that we have to read the midrash without taking the words
"u'phrateha, v'dikdukeha" literally.  But remember that the Havot Yair did
acknowledge the dohak nature of such an approach.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

A thought on the Divrei Sofrim problem.  I think that the way to
understand what the Rambam meant by Divrei Sofrim is to remember that
there clearly is a d'oraita obligation to observe the halachah as
expounded by the shofet or the beit din of our own days.  According to
the Rambam all halachot derived from the Biblical text through the
application of some hermeneutical principle are in the class of Divrei
Sofrim.  Divrei Sofrim is thus a descriptive category, not a halachic
category, refering to the origin of the obligation, not its nature.  Now
what is the nature of the obligation to observe such mitzvot?  For
example, when there is some doubt whether the obligation does in fact
devolve on a person, is the person still obligated to perform the mitzvah? 
The oblgation to perform a mitzvah in such circumstances is itself not
explictly discussed in the Torah, so we only know what to do, because
Chazal decided how to resolve such doubtful cases.  

To do so, they intorduced a halachic distinction between d'oraita
obligations and d'rabbanan obligations.  Thus, Chazal tell us that when
we are faced with doubtful situations, we are required to perform
d'oraita obligations, but not required to perform d'rabbanan obligations. 
When do d'oraita obligations occur?  When the source is an explicit
Biblical verse that does not require any hermeneutical derivation (min
ha-Torah) or when the hermeneutical derivation is so straightforward
and so compelling that is as if it were actually stated explicitly.  Thus,
there are obligations derived mi-divrei sofrim which, nevertheless, have
a d'oraita character.  On the other hand, there are derivations of a
weaker nature (r'mazim, asmakhtot, etc.) that are not powerful enough to
have triggered a d'oraita obligation and were therefore do not impose a
d'oraita obligation, but only a weaker d'rabban obligation.  Thus, the term
divrei sofrim refers to the origin of an obligation, not its character,
whereas the terms d'oraita and d'rabbanan refer not to the origin of the
obligation, but to its character.

An example of this distinction is found in the Rambam in Hilchot Treifot. 
The Rambam distinguishes between the plain meaning of treifah, which
is nat'ta la'mut mi-makoteha, close to death because of injuries (which
may or may not have occurred because of the attack of a wild beast). 
The Rambam finds it logically untenable to restrict the category of treifa
just to injuries sustained as a result of the attack of a wild beast, so he
interprets the verse basar b'sadeh treifah as simply an instance of
dibrah Torah b'lashon hoveh.  However, the Rambam then lists the eight
categories of treifah whose source is not scripture but halachah l'Moshe
mi-Sinai.  Unlike the treifah of scripture, these treifot, though they may
cause death within 12 months, are not so serious that an animal is
considered nat'ta la-mut because of them.  For eating such a treifa one
could not receive makot, since one cannot receive makot for violating an
issur based on a halachah l'Moshe mi-Sinai.  Moreover, if there is a safek
concerning these treifot, the safek is permissible because of the principle
safek d'rabbanan likulah.  However, there is one treifah which is an
exception to this principle which is d'rusah, poisoning.  Since the attack
of a wild beast is presumed to involve some transfer of venom from the
attacker to the victim, the category of d'rusah is presumed to be
sufficiently close to the Biblical category of treifah, that Chazal were
mahmir and prohibited such safek, even though one would still not
receive makot for eating a vadai d'rusah that was not nat'ta la-mut.  For
an extended discussion, see Dor Revi'i, P'ticha, ikar 10.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

Permit me a brief speculation:  Couldn't the Rambam be using Divrei Sofrim as a 
term referring to those Halochos that have an indirect connection to the text 
without a clear, direct connection?

1) This would still leave the deRabbonon vs. De'oraiso issue in dispute. 
2) This would exclude both 13 Middos, as wells a Takkono/Gezeiro
3) I'm not clear how this relates to Halocho le'Moshe miSinai  

Regards,
Rich Wolpoe 

I know we're all high level and all that stuff,  but IMHO the level of
"Yeshivish" as opposed to English is getting out of hand.  My $.02

Gershon

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Hear! hear! (translation into yeshivish: I hear! I hear!).

On Tue, 1 Dec 1998, Gershon Dubin wrote:

> I know we're all high level and all that stuff,  but IMHO the level of
> "Yeshivish" as opposed to English is getting out of hand.  My $.02
> 

YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

The question was raised recently whether Chillul HaShem is only with
things that can be interpreted as sin or lead to sin.

The Maharal (4 perek of Derech Chaim) has an extensive discussion. In
particular the fact that Chillul HaShem is defined in terms of the
behavior of a talmid chachom. There are two basic factors - either
people interpret a talmid chachom as doing something that they interpret
as sinful or alternatively    when people observe a representative of
Torah and say - who would want to be a Torah Scholar?. Thus Chilul
HaShem can be defined as behavior which causes people to despise Torah.

R' Aryeh KaplanHandbook of Jewish Thought II  (page 15) " ...this is a
commandment not to do anything which could make people despise G-d or
His teachings.

Thus it seems logical that  if the Jewish people are viewed  in a
negative light this would constitute Chilul HaShem - as long it is not
because they keep Mitzvos.

1) Therefore the issue becomes Is appearing weak and giving away land a
bigger chilul hashem than appear cruel and oppressive and not
accommodating the Arabs - assuming the pikuach nefesh is not involved?

2) The gemora (shabbos 75a) states that it is a Mitzva to be competent
in astronomy. This is as Rashi points out because the goyim view this as
chochma  - and therefore the gemora notes that they are  impressed with
someone who has this knowledge.. [In Chumash he explains the verse to be
referring to Torah]. I have heard claims based on this gemora - that if
a Talmid chachom  is not viewed as  knowledgeable about the world and
thus is despised by the masses  - that would be a chilul hashem.
Does anybody know of any discussion of this issue? The gemora itself
doesn't mention the issue of chilul hashem.


                                     Daniel Eidensohn

In a message dated 98-12-01 02:04:06 EST, you write:

<< 
 Some examples are given by Chaim Wasserman
 
 >> consider Yoma 86a where Rav felt that asking his butcher
 >> for credit in the purchase of meat would be for him chillul Hashem. And
Rav
 >> Yochanan similarly indicated that four amos for him without Torah and
tefillin
 >> would be a chillul Hashem.
 
 In all these cases the person is doing something that is improper, at least
on
 the level of lifnei meshurat hadin. There is no source that I know of
 that applies chillul hashem to doing a mitzva in a situation that
nonreligious
 people don't approve of. Hence, if one believes that giving back land is
 prohibited (lo techonen) there is no chillul hashem in insisting on this.
  >>

The gemora in sotah 5b states"Kol hasham orchotov bolam hazeh, zoche vroe
byishuato shel hakadosh baruch hu". Rashi understands this to mean one who is
"mchashev hefsed mitzvah kneged schara". The sfat emet adds that it includes
one who evaluates the mitzvot he does since oftentimes they can cause other
issues and thus one needs to consider when and where one does his mitzvot.

Kol Tuv
Joel Rich

In my previous postings I noted that there is a Medrash that seems
explicitly to consider Chillul Hashem cheshbonos in Yishuv EY. My esteemed
colleagues here seem to be ignoring this citation, so I cite it again, ET,
entry on Chillul Hashem, fn 103.

We should note that in Shmuel II:21 Dovid leaves Shaul's sons hanging
overnight - an explicit prohibition in the Torah - because of the Chillul
Hashem that might be involved in insufficient appeasement of the Giv'onim,
see the Radak there. 

YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

I have 2 questions regarding the discussion on emulating the avot.

1. Does it apply to the 12 tribes?
   In particular is there anyone who says that the action of the brothers was
   not a sin both of loshan ha-rah and of the actual sale.
   The medrash that the ten martyrs were instead of the ten brothers certainly
   implies there was a major sin that waited centuries until it could be atoned.

2. Is there any Gemara that brings an action of the avot as support for a
   halachic discussion
   ^^^^^^^^

kol tuv,
Eli Turkel

********************


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